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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this appeal 
was transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 - Whether the May 1, 2003, Summary Judgment ratified 
Ninow's Action by Shareholder Consent, which removed Lowe and Rose as 
officers and directors of the Loan Office. (Lowe and Rose frame the issue as a 
question of whether the May 1, 2003, Summary Judgment "vested title" of the 
shares in Ninow, which Ninow does not claim.) 
Standard of Review - The matter of the Action by Shareholder 
Consent, which removed Lowe and Rose as officers and directors of the Loan 
Office was a finding of fact by the trial court. Findings of fact are reviewed under 
a clearly erroneous standard. Softsolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ., 2000 
UT 46, t 12. 
Preservation of Issue - Lowe and Rose challenge the May 1, 2003, 
Summary Judgment but failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
Issue No. 2 - Whether the June 12, 2003, order setting aside the November 
2002 default judgment should be reversed. 
Standard of Review - The trial court set aside the November 2002 
default judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). "A trial court has discretion in 
1 
determining whether a movant has shown Rule 60(b) grounds, and this Court will 
reverse the trial court's ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion." 
Franklin Covev Client Sales. Inc. V. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110, If 9. 
Preservation of Issue - This issue was not preserved below by any 
party with standing. Lowe and Rose may have advocated setting the default 
judgment aside, but they have no protectible interest in the default judgment and 
no standing to challenge the trial court's action. 
Issue No. 3 - Whether the portion of the Final Order on the May 29, 2002, 
that purports to remove William Lowe and Augusta Rose as officers and directors 
of the Loan Office should be reversed. 
Standard of Review - This is a question of law that should be 
reviewed for correctness. 
Preservation of Issue - Lowe and Rose failed to preserve this issue for 
appeal. (Lowe and Rose contend they preserved this issue by filing their notice of 
appeal). 
Issue No. 4 - Whether it was error for the trial court to deny Lowe and 
Rose's motion to recover against the surety's undertaking on the preliminary 
injunction. 
2 
Standard of Review - To the extent this issue requires interpretation 
of rules of civil procedure, it presents a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. Harris v. IES Assocs.. Inc.. 2003 UT App 112, ^ 25. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Utah Civil Rule of Procedure 54(c)(2) states, in relevant part: 
A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in 
amount, that specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
Utah Civil Rule of Procedure 60(b) states, in relevant part: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for 
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under 
this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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Utah Civil Rule of Procedure 65A(c)(3) states, in relevant part: 
Jurisdiction over surety. A surety upon a bond or undertaking under 
this rule submits to the jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably 
appoints the clerk of the court as agent upon whom any papers 
affecting the surety's liability on the bond or undertaking may be 
served. The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the 
necessity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the 
motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court 
who shall forthwith mail copies to the persons giving the security if 
their addresses are known. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a probate case in which several other lawsuits were 
consolidated. The probate matter centered around ownership of two assets: a loan 
office corporation, and two parcels of real estate. The issue of the loan office 
ownership was resolved in a prior appeal of this same case. Although ownership 
of the real estate has been resolved, no order regarding such was entered. A 
purported final order in the probate matter was entered which lead to this appeal. 
In a separate shareholder derivative action, a default judgment was entered against 
Appellant and was later set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Gary G. Pahl passed away on June 25, 2000. On September 6, 2000, 
the trial court appointed KaLynn Ninow ("Ninow") Personal Representative of 
Gary G. PahFs estate and decreed that Gary G. Pahl died intestate. Pursuant to the 
laws of intestacy under the Uniform Probate Code, all property in Gary G. Pahlfs 
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estate passed to his son Ryan B. Pahl, as his sole heir. (R. 693, 1121.) At the time 
of his death, Gary Pahl owned all 6,000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc. (the "Loan Office"). (R. 892) 
2. On May 15, 2002, Ninow, holding legal title to the 6,000 shares of 
common stock of the Loan Office executed a shareholder action by consent in 
accordance with Utah Code Annotated §16-10a-704 which removed William T. 
Lowe ("Lowe") and Augusta Rose ("Rose") as officers and directors of the Loan 
Office. (R. 1122, U 21; Addendum Exh. B 121) 
2.1 A copy of the action by consent was sent certified mail along with 
other documents to Lowe and Rose and their counsel, Mr. Copier. (R. 1122 If 20; 
Addendum Exh. B f 20) 
3. On May 20, 2002, the trial court issued a Temporary Restraining 
Order ("TRO") in favor of Ninow against Lowe, Rose (and their agents) wherein 
such parties were ordered to "immediately desist from conducting any further 
activities purportedly on behalf of the Loan Office or as manager(s) of the [real 
estate properties associated with Gary Pahl's estate]." (R. 1122, ^ 22; Addendum 
Exh. A Tf 22) 
3.1 On or about May 29, 2002, Ninow, by and through counsel, filed a 
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Petition to determine two issues: 1) ownership of the Loan Office; and 2) 
ownership of real estate located at 1588 and 1594 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah (the "State Street Property"). (R. 471; Addendum Exh. P) 
4. During TRO/preliminary injunction proceedings, Lowe and Rose, 
presented seven documents to the trial court attached to a brief entitled "Argument 
in Opposition to Injunction." (R. 1123, ]} 26, 27) One of the documents, entitled 
"Amendment of By-Laws of PahFs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc." and purportedly 
signed by Gary Pahl and William Lowe, was found by the Court to be a forgery. 
(R. 1123,1}27) 
5. A second document that was attached to Lowe and Rose's brief, 
entitled "Bill of Sale Agreement" bearing the date of December 28, 1998, was 
presented to the court in an effort to prove that 3000 shares of the Loan Office 
were sold by Gary Pahl to the Loan Office before Gary's death. (R. 1123, If 28) 
6. The Court later found, however, that none of the requirements or 
conditions precedent of the December 28, 1998, Bill of Sale Agreement (the 
"December Agreement") had ever been met and thus, no transfer of shares from 
Gary Pahl to the Loan Office was ever completed. (R. 1124-29, ^ | 30, 49, 54) 
7. Minutes of alleged Board of Directors Meetings were also submitted 
to the Court by Lowe and Rose which purportedly documented the transfer of the 
6 
3000 shares in question to Lowe who, one week later, transferred the shares 
equally between Rose and Robert K. Mortensen. (R. 1124, f 31) 
7.1 On May 31, 2002, the TRO was converted to a Preliminary 
Injunction. (R. 501). The formal Order Granting Preliminary Injunction was later 
entered August 26, 2002. (R. 886) 
7.2 The Preliminary Injunction specifically orders, adjudges, and decrees 
that Respondents Lowe, Rose and 
any of their agents . . . [and] attorneys, and all those 
acting in concert with them . . . shall immediately desist 
from conducting any further activities purportedly on 
behalf of the Loan Office or as manager(s) of the 
aforementioned real estate. 
The phrase "aforementioned real estate" refers therein to "the real property located 
at 1588 & 1594 South State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah," which property was 
the subject of the May 29, 2002, Petition. (R . 886; Addendum Exh. A; R. 471) 
7.3 The Preliminary Injunction also provides that it shall 
continue until further order of the Court or until an 
ultimate determination on the merits of KaLynn Ninow's 
underlying Petition for Determination of Ownership for 
Shares of Stock and Interests in Real Estate filed with 
this Court [the May 29, 2002, Petition]. 
(R . 886; Addendum Exh. A) 
8. On June 4, 2002, following the issuance of the Preliminary 
Injunction, Robert Copier, attorney for Lowe, filed with the Court a "Stock 
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Transfer Notice and Request for Notice" purporting to transfer 3000 shares of 
stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. (1500 transferred outright and 1500 
held in escrow by Lowe) to a Utah corporation known as Grand Staircase Land 
Company, Inc. (R. 1124, f 32) 
9. On July 5, 2002, Copier filed a second stock transfer notice 
purporting to transfer 1500 shares of stock in the Loan Office from Grand 
Staircase Land Company to Diamond Fork Land Company ("Diamond Fork"). (R. 
1124,TJ33) 
9.1 A "Certified Copy of the Entire File" from the Utah Department of 
Commerce, demonstrated that Robert Copier (counsel for Lowe and Rose) is the 
only officer and the only director of both Diamond Fork, and Grand Staircase 
Land Company. (R. 1124,1f 34) 
10. On or about July 26, 2002, Ninow moved the Court for summary 
judgment as to her claim in the May 29, 2002, Petition that Gary Pahl owned all 
shares of stock of the Loan Office at the time of his death. (R. 683) 
11. On August 26, 2002, Judge Medley, ruling from the bench after oral 
argument, granted Ninow's motion for summary judgment, ruling that all 6,000 
shares of the Loan Office are property that belong to the Estate of Gary Pahl and 
to Ryan Pahl as the only devisee of the Estate. (R. 892) 
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12. On May 1, 2003, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law re: Summary Judgment and an Order Granting Summary Judgment. (R. 
1117; Addendum Exh. B) In the findings of fact, the Court found that all property 
of Gary Pahl's estate passed to his son Ryan B. Pahl as his sole heir. (R. 1121, 
119) 
13. Ultimately, the trial court found as a matter of law that "Neither Gary 
Pahl nor his Estate was ever compensated as required under the December 28, 
1998 Bill of Sale Agreement.. . . According to the express terms of the 
agreement, the stock never became treasury stock of the corporation, and the 
subsequent 'transfers' have all been void ab initio." (R. 1129, ]f 2) 
14. Lowe and Rose appealed the May 1, 2003, Order Granting Summary 
Judgment, and on September 2, 2004, in Ninow v. Lowe., 2004 UT App 291 
("Ninow I"), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed that Gary Pahl owned all 6,000 
shares of the Loan Office stock at the time of his death. (R. 1887) 
The Diamond Fork Case formerly before Judge Hilder1 
1
 The record for the Diamond Fork case (Civil No. 020908627) has been 
destroyed. (R. 3819) The parties have supplemented the record with copies of 
various documents in their possession, but not all documents that were filed in the 
Diamond Fork case are contained in the record. Appellee will cite to the docket in 
some instances to show simply that the referenced document was in fact filed, and 
in other instances to the document itself. 
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15. On September 3, 2002, just 8 days after Judge Medley ruled from the 
bench regarding Ryan Pahfs ownership of the Loan Office shares (R. 1114.), 
Lowe and Rose's attorney, Mr. Copier, filed a complaint purportedly on behalf of 
Diamond Fork and the Loan Office and against Kalynn Ninow. (R. 4026) The 
case was assigned case number 020908627. (R. 4026) 
16. The Complaint purported to be a shareholder derivative action 
seeking to "vindicate the rights" of the Loan Office corporation. (R. 4028) 
17. The Complaint sought to divest title to Ninow's 3,000 shares of stock 
relying on the December Agreement, and to ensure Rose and Lowe's ability to act 
on behalf of the Loan Office. (R. 4026) 
18. On November 25, 2002, in response to the Diamond Fork Complaint, 
Ninow served and filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Consolidate and/or 
Transfer Case to Judge Medley. (R. 4053, 3815) 
19. On November 26, 2002, the trial court, not knowing a responsive 
pleading had been filed the day before, entered Default Judgment in favor of the 
Loan Office and against Kalynn Ninow. (R. 3815, 23-Case No. 0309070642) 
2
 A copy of the Default Judgment is attached to a letter that was filed in a 
separate case numbered 030907064, and which was later consolidated into the 
probate case, case number 003901101. The record, therefore, actually contains 
two records: 1) the first is the record for 003901101, which is indexed with 
numbers 1 to 4092; this record contains the record from the probate case and 
(continued...) 
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20. The docket for the Diamond Fork case shows that defendant's default 
or a default certificate was never entered prior to entering default judgment and 
that Diamond Fork simply filed a proposed Default Judgment. (R. 3815) 
21. The Default Judgment purports to vest title to 3000 shares of the 
Loan Office in the name of two parties: 1) Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic 
Education Trust (With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for Equity and Justice as the 
beneficial owner) and 2) Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust (With Diamond 
Fork Land Company, a Utah Corporation, as the beneficial owner) (these parties 
are referred to herein as the "Bangkok Parties"). (R. 23-Case No. 030907064) 
22. On June 12, 2003, the trial court set aside the Default Judgment. (R. 
4053) 
23. On or about July 2, 2003, Diamond Fork moved the court to vacate 
the order setting aside the default judgment. (R. 4057) On or about July 15, 2003, 
Ninow filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the motion. (R. 3818) 
24. Diamond Fork's Motion to Vacate the order setting aside the default 
judgment was never submitted to the Court for decision. On March 12, 2004, 
2(...continued) 
various documents from case number 020908627 (see note 1); and 2) the second is 
the record for case number 030907064, which is indexed with numbers 1 to 399. 
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Diamond Fork admitted that it lacked standing in the matter and moved the court 
to dismiss Civil No. 020908027. (R. 4079; Addendum Exh. G) 
25. On April 15, 2004, Civil No. 020908027 was consolidated into this 
probate proceeding. (R. 1421.) On May 11, 2004, the trial court dismissed the 
case formerly known as Civil No. 020908027 pursuant to Diamond Fork's 
unopposed Motion to Dismiss. (R. 4083; Addendum Exh. H) 
26. The caption of the court's dismissal of the Diamond Fork case clearly 
indicates the case being dismissed is the Diamond Fork case formerly before 
Judge Hilder. (R. 4083; Addendum Exh. H) 
Lowe's Motion for Liability on the Undertaking 
27. On or about November 20, 2004, Lowe filed a Motion to Enforce 
Surety's Liability, which moved the trial court to set a hearing to determine the 
surety's liability on the undertaking with respect to the TRO. (R. 2031) In this 
Motion, Lowe alleged damages and claimed that he had been wrongfully 
restrained by the TRO. (R. 2031) 
28. On or about April 6, 2005, the trial court denied Lowe's Motion to 
Enforce Surety's Liability. (R. 2555) 
Ninow's Contempt Proceedings Against Lowe, Rose and Mr. Copier 
29. On or about March 7, 2005, pursuant to Ninow's motion, the trial 
court issued the first of several Orders to Show Cause naming as Respondents 
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Lowe, Rose, and Robert H. Copier, counsel for Lowe and Rose. (R. 2363) 
Diamond Fork was later added as a party to the Order to Show Cause. (R. 3221-
22) 
30. The Orders to Show Cause require the Respondents named above to 
show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court for violating the 
Preliminary Injunction and acting in contravention of the May 1, 2003, Order of 
Summary Judgment. (R. 3221-22) 
31. In her affidavit in support of the Order to Show Cause, Ninow alleges 
that certain actions of Lowe, Rose, Mr. Copier and Diamond Fork Land Company 
constituted contempt of the trial court's prior preliminary injunction (see f^l[ 7.1 -
7.3) and order of summary judgment regarding the shares. Those actions include, 
but are not limited to: 1) acting on behalf of the Loan Office by filing the Diamond 
Fork case (R. 4026) and; 2) acting on behalf of the Loan Office by filing the 
lawsuit seeking to evict Ryan Pahl from the Loan Office premises (R. 1- Case No. 
030907064), and 3) other actions by Lowe, Rose, Mr. Copier, and/or Diamond 
Fork Land Company. (R. 2363) 
32. On April 6, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on the contempt 
proceedings and stated, in the hearing minutes, "The Court takes the order to show 
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling." (R. 2555) 
33. On May 26, 2005, Judge Lewis rendered a Memorandum Decision 
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regarding the April 6, 2005, hearing, in which she held, among other things, that 
the May 2003 Summary Judgment was a partial summary judgment and that Lowe 
was subject to the Preliminary Injunction. (R. 2787; Addendum Exh. K) The 
court also set an evidentiary hearing on the contempt matter. (R. 2787; Addendum 
Exh. K) 
The April 26, 2005. Ruling and Order 
34. Between the April 6, 2005, hearing on the Order to Show Cause and 
the May 26, 2005, Memorandum Decision being issued, counsel for Lowe and 
Rose filed a proposed Ruling and Order, which was signed and entered by Judge 
Lewis on April 26, 2005. (R. 2609; Addendum Exh. J) 
35. A copy of the April 26, 2005 proposed Order was purportedly served 
on counsel for Ninow on April 21, 2005. (R. 2609; Addendum Exh. J) Counsel 
for Ninow hereby certifies that they never received a copy of the proposed Order 
in 2005 and that the first time Ninow saw such order was in preparation for this 
appeal. 
36. The April 2005 Ruling and Order and the May 2005 Memorandum 
Decision drafted by Judge Lewis differ in the following significant respects, 
suggesting that the April 26, 2005 order was inadvertently signed by Judge Lewis: 
[table on next page] 
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1 April 2005 Order 
States that "this shall constitute the 
final order as to all claims and all 
parties to any and all probate 
proceedings pending under this 
probate number." (R. 2609; 
Addendum Exh. J) 
States that contempt proceedings 
against Lowe, Rose and Copier are 
now properly dismissed without the 
need for an evidentiary hearing. (R. 
2610; Addendum Exh. J) 
May 2005 Memorandum Decision 
Makes no claim regarding whether the 
decision is a final order as to all claims 
and all parties under this probate 
number. (R. 2787.) Rather, the Court 
concludes thai the May 1, 2003 Order 
of Summary Judgment by Judge 
Medley was only a partial summary 
judgment and that certain issues in the 
Probate Petition remain pending. (R. 
2789; Addendum Exh. K) 
Schedules an evidentiary hearing in 
order to (1) determine which parties 
should be subject to the rulings of this 
decision and of the contempt hearing, 
and (2) whether those parties subject to 
the contempt hearing violated the 
preliminary injunction. (R. 2790; 
Addendum Exh. K) 
37. On October 12, 2005, the trial court scheduled another contempt 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause for November 17, 2005. (R. 3354) The 
Minutes of that hearing were entered by Judge Lewis, who again took the 
contempt issue under advisement. (R. 3506) 
Final Order on the May 29. 2002 Petition 
38. On or about August 12, 2005, Lowe and Rose, by and through their 
attorney, Mr. Copier, submitted a proposed final order on the May 29, 2002, 
Petition. (R. 3200; Addendum Exh. L) 
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39. On or about August 17, 2005, Ninow timely objected to the proposed 
final order. (R. 3196) 
40. On or about August 16, 2005, without considering Ninow's timely 
objection and before the five day deadline for filing an objection had passed, 
Judge Lewis signed the purported Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition. (R. 
3200; Addendum Exh. L) 
41. On or about August 25, 2005, Lowe and Rose submitted a second 
proposed Final Order on the May 29, 2002, Petition, which edits out certain parts 
of the previous proposed order, apparently in light of Ninow's objection. (R. 
3206) 
42. The August 25, 2005, Final Order contains the blatant 
misrepresentation that Ninow had "admitted by written filing dated July 8, 2005, 
that she will not pursue the merits of her May 29, 2002, petition beyond the May 
1, 2003, order granting summary judgment. . .." (R. 3200; Addendum Exh. L) 
43. The only filing by Ninow dated July 8, 2005, is a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Stay. (R. 3080; Addendum Exh. O) That memorandum 
does not contain the admission or statement of Ninow as claimed in the August 16, 
2005, Final Order. (R. 3080; Addendum Exh. O) 
44. It is obvious from the record that Ninow and even Lowe and Rose 
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continued to litigate the May 29, 2002, Petition beyond May 1, 2003. Ninow filed 
a motion for summary judgment regarding ownership of the real estate on May 21, 
2004. (R. 1458) Lowe and Rose themselves litigated the issue by filing a 
Memorandum Opposing the Summary Judgment Motion (R. 1666) and even filed 
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 1688) 
45. Lowe and Rose continued to litigate in the probate case after final 
resolution of the Loan Office shares even though they expressly disclaimed any 
ownership in the real estate. (R. 1411, 1413; Addendum Exh. N) The real estate 
issues were the only pending issues under the May 29, 2002, Petition. 
46. In the August 2005 Final Order, Lowe and Rose also purport to 
"remove" themselves as officers and directors of the Loan Office. (R. 3200; 
Addendum Exh. L) They could not have been removed, however, because they 
had already been removed by shareholder consent in May of 2002. See f 2, 2.1 
supra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The August 2005 Final Order which purports to remove Lowe and Rose as 
officers and directors of the Loan Office should not be reveresed because Lowe 
and Rose themselves submitted the Order. They cannot complain on appeal of 
alleged error they themselves committed. 
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The April 2005 Ruling and Order should be disregarded as it manifestly 
contradicts the parties' and trial court's subsequent actions and the trial court's 
subsequent Memorandum Decision. If the April 2005 Ruling and Order is to be 
given effect, it should be considered a final appealable order and this appeal 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
The May 1, 2003, Summary Judgment, which was affirmed in Ninow I, was 
in substance a partial summary judgment that did not preclude continued litigation 
of the real estate issues. The trial court properly denied Lowe's motion for 
liability on the TRO undertaking because Lowe failed to show he was wrongfully 
restrained. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the setting aside of a default 
judgment because the parties to the case in which such judgment was entered are 
not before the Court, and Lowe and Rose lack standing to challenge the setting 
aside. Even if they did have standing, the trial court acted properly in setting aside 
the default judgment because it was void and improper, and the trial court acted 
within its discretion in setting it aside. 
Finally, Ninow is entitled to her costs and attorneys fees on appeal for this 
frivolous appeal. Lowe and Rose have plainly abused the legal system in their 
improper attempts to gain control of the Loan Office. This appeal is a continued 
abuse of the legal system and the Court should award Ninow her costs and 
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attorneys fees for having to defend this frivolous appeal and for failing to adhere 
to appellate briefing requirements and standards. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S REMOVAL OF LOWE AND ROSE AS 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC. SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED. 
Lowe and Rose (may be collectively referred to herein as "Lowe") contend 
that only the portion of the August 2005 order that removes them as officers and 
directors should be reversed. Lowe's fails to assign any point of error as to the 
removal and failed to preserve this issue for appeal. If there was error, it was 
invited error that cannot be considered on appeal. 
A. The removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and directors of the Loan 
Office is invited error and cannot be considered on appeal. 
As evidenced by Mr. Copier's name and address in the upper left hand 
corner of the August 16, 2005, Order (see Addendum Exh. L), it was not Ninow 
but Rose and Lowe who actually submitted the order that expressly removed them 
as officers and directors. Ninow timely objected to the order for other reasons not 
related to Lowe and Rose's removal. See % 38. The Order contained a blatant 
misrepresentation as to Ninow's litigation of remaining real estate issues under the 
May 29, 2002, Petition. See ^ 4 2 - 4 5 . 
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The Order was signed by Judge Lewis over the objection of Ninow. It 
appears that the only reason for the submission of the August 2005 Order was to 
create an Order from which Rose and Lowe could appeal as being a final order on 
the May 29, 2002, Petition, and more importantly, to retroactively end the effects 
of the May 2002 Preliminary Injunction. There is no other proper reason since 
Lowe and Rose expressly disclaimed any interest in the real property of the Estate 
(see Addendum Exh. N) and therefore should not have even participated in the 
probate litigation subsequent to the May 2003, summary judgment. 
As the parties who prepared the August 16, 2005, Order, Lowe and Rose 
chose to memorialize their removal as officers and directors, creating, at best, 
invited error that Rose and Lowe cannot challenge on appeal. "The doctrine of 
invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then 
complaining of it on appeal." Paulos v. Covenant Transport, Inc.. 2004 UT App 
35, Tf 30. Calling this issue "invited error," however, is a bit of a misnomer. After 
all, it was not technically "error" that Lowe and Rose were removed, but merely an 
unnecessary redundancy since they had previously been removed. See 12. 
Nevertheless, Lowe and Rose cannot be allowed to propose language to the Court 
in a proposed order then later claim that such Order was in error. 
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B. The issue of the removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and directors 
of the Loan Office was not preserved for appeal. 
Closely related to the issue of invited error here is the rule that issues must 
be preserved in order to be considered on appeal. S.K. and J.K. v. State, 2007 UT 
App 67, f^ 7. Lowe and Rose contend that they preserved the issue of their 
removal as officers and directors of the Loan Office "by filing a notice of appeal." 
See Appellants' Amended Openining Brief, page 8. If issues could be preserved 
by filing a notice of appeal, however, the statement that an issue was preserved 
below would become a tautology rather than a contention subject to proof. 
Lowe's failure to preserve this issue precludes the Court's consideration of such 
on appeal. 
C. The Law of the Case prohibits consideration of Lowe and Rose's 
removal as officers and directors of the Loan Office. 
The Court adjudicated the removal of Lowe and Rose as officers and 
directors of the Loan Office in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: 
Summary Judgment entered on May 1, 2003. See ]f 2; Addendum Exh. B. Any 
challenge of those findings should have been raised in Ninow L the first appeal of 
this probate matter, but Lowe failed to do so even then. 
Since the findings were not challenged at that time, those findings stand as 
the law of the case and cannot be challenged now. See Thurston v. Box Elder 
County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1042, n. 2 (Utah 1995)("a lower court ruling becomes 
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binding on a higher court through failure of the parties to preserve an issue for 
review.")(citation omitted). In other words, since the first appeal involved the 
issues surrounding ownership and control of the Loan Office, none of those issues 
or related findings (including the removal of Lowe and Rose as officers) can be 
considered in this appeal, regardless of whether such issues were raised in the first 
appeal. This Court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction to consider this issue. 
II. THE APRIL 26, 2005, RULING AND ORDER SHOULD BE 
DISREGARDED, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IF THE COURT 
REGARDS SUCH ORDER AS EFFECTIVE, THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION. 
Counsel for Ninow first learned of the April 26, 2005, Ruling and Order In 
preparation for this appeal as they never received a copy of the proposed Ruling 
and Order in 2005. This is supported by the record, which shows that the parties 
as well as the trial court acted as if the Order had never been entered. Given the 
circumstances, this Court should disregard the April 2005 Ruling and Order as an 
anomaly and without effect. In the alternative, if the Court chooses to give effect 
to the April 2005 Ruling and Order, such Order should be considered a final order 
and this appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
A. The April 2005 Ruling and Order should be disregarded. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) states as follows: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the 
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prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, 
serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the 
court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within 
five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon 
expiration of the time to object. 
While it is not apparent from the record why Judge Lewis signed the proposed 
Ruling and Order, it is clear from the minutes of the April 2005 hearing that Lowe 
and Rose were not "prevailing parties" and that Judge Lewis indicated she would 
prepare a written ruling herself. See ^ 32; Addendum Exh. M. Also, it is clear 
from the certificate of service that Mr. Copier did not wait the prescribed time for 
an objection to the proposed order. He simply filed the proposed order at the same 
time he served the opposing party. Otherwise, Judge Lewis would not have been 
able to sign the Order only five days after service. 
In addition to the procedural irregularities surrounding the April 2005 
Order, the evidence from the record and the course of action of the parties 
following such Ruling and Order show that the parties and the trial court judge 
were not even aware such an Order had been signed. After all, just a short time 
later in May 2005, Judge Lewis issued her own Memorandum Decision, which 
totally contradicts the supposed prior Ruling and Order. See fflf 33, 36; Addendum 
Exhs. J, K. Lowe and Rose made no objection to the May 2005 memorandum 
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decision and did not move to set it aside. For these reasons, the Court should 
disregard the extraneous April 2005 Ruling and Order. 
B. If the Court gives effect to the April 2005 Ruling and Order, this 
appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
In the alternative, the Court may choose to regard the April 2005 Ruling and 
Order as fully effective. By its own terms, the Order states that it "concludes all 
litigation now pending or that had been pending under Probate No. 003901101." 
See R. 2612; Addendum Exh. J. As such, the Order would be a final appealable 
order since it: 1) resolved an issue of vital importance, and 2) concluded a major 
phase in the probate (it actually concluded the probate as a whole). See In re 
Estate of Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Voorhees. 12 
Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980. 
To properly appeal this matter, Lowe and Rose were required to file a notice 
of appeal within 30 days from April 26, 2005. See Utah R. App. P. 4. Since Lowe 
and Rose filed their Notice of Appeal in September 2005 (see R. 3303), more than 
30 days following the final order, the Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
III. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RULE THAT THE 
MAY 1, 2003, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
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The trial court held that the May 1, 2003, Summary Judgment was a partial 
summary judgment. Such ruling was not error. 
A. In substance, the Order of Summary Judgment was a partial summary 
judgment. 
The Petition of May 29, 2002, requested resolution of two issues: 1) 
ownership of a business (the Loan Office), and 2) ownership of real property (the 
"State Street property"). The Order of Summary Judgment entered May 1, 2003, 
disposed of only one of those issues, namely, ownership of the Loan Office. 
Ownership of the real property was still to be determined and was actually 
litigated in the trial court over the next several years. A final order on the May 29, 
2002 Petition was not entered until August 2006 (that order is the final Order that 
forms the basis of the present appeal). The probate matter is still not concluded as 
contempt proceedings are still pending. The Summary Judgment, therefore, 
although not styled as such, was in effect and substance a partial summary 
judgment. 
The trial court recognized this fact and in its Memorandum Decision 
explained as follows: 
After carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes that while 
styled as an Order of Summary Judgment, Judge Medley actually 
granted only a partial summary judgment as to the portion of claims 
dealing with the ownership of the 6,000 shares of Pahfs Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc. ("Loan Office"). In fact, as the petitioner correctly 
points out, the Probate Petition is still pending because the second 
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portion of the claims, dealing with the ownership of certain State 
Street property, has yet to be adjudicated. Therefore, the Court rules 
that the Preliminary Injunction did not expire with the entry of the 
Order of Summary Judgment. Rather, the Preliminary Injunction 
remains in place and defendant Lowe remains subject to it. 
See Addendum Exh. K. The trial court's reasoning is sound and does not merit 
further consideration on appeal. The ruling of the trial court should be summarily 
affirmed.3 
B. The ability to appeal from the partial summary judgment in a probate 
proceeding does not convert a partial summary judgment into a full 
summary judgment. 
In Ninow L 2004 UT App 291, this Court found that the May 1, 2003, Order 
of Summary Judgment was a final, appealable order. Lowe and Rose argue that 
this fact alone necessarily implies that the Order was also a non-partial summary 
judgment. In doing so, they urge this Court to elevate form over substance. 
3
 One must question why it matters to Lowe and Rose whether the Order of 
Summary Judgment was a partial or "full" summary judgment? Lowe and Rose appear to 
be motivated to reverse this ruling in an effort to create a defense for themselves after-
the-fact in the pending contempt proceedings. The Preliminary Injunction entered by the 
trial court (which has not been challenged on appeal), by its terms, expires upon a final 
determination of the May 29, 2002 Petition. 
Presumably, the earlier Lowe and Rose could show that the Petition was 
resolved, the better. They avoid being held in contempt for violating that Injunction by 
arguing that the Preliminary Injunction expired. That argument, however, lacks any merit 
and does not reflect what actually transpired in the trial court. The Order of Summary 
Judgment was clearly a partial summary judgment as the trial court held. The Court 
should not condone the use of its tribunal to create a contempt defense after the fact. 
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While Ninow concedes that the Order was "final" for purposes of appeal, it 
did not ultimately determine or dispose of the probate matter as a whole. Indeed, 
the probate action continued in the trial court for several years after the entry of 
the summary judgment order so that the parties could litigate the issue of the 
ownership of the real property. To say that the Order was a "final, appealable 
order" is equivalent only to recognizing that the Order both: 1) resolved an issue 
of vital importance (the ownership of the business), and 2) concluded a major 
phase in the probate (a major remaining phase being ownership of the real estate). 
See In re Estate of Christensen. 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of 
Voorhees. 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980. That, however, does not preclude a 
finding that the Order of Summary Judgment was, in substance, a partial summary 
judgment, notwithstanding its lack of being styled as such. In conclusion, Lowe 
and Rose's argument fails, and the trial court's determination that the May 1, 2003 
Order of Summary Judgment was a partial summary judgment should be affirmed. 
IV. THE MAY 2003 SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DISPOSITIVE AND 
FINAL AS TO OWNERSHIP OF THE LOAN OFFICE SHARES 
Lowe and Rose still attempt to cast doubt on the ownership of the Loan 
Office shares. Ninow held legal title as Personal Representative of Gary's estate 
and as a matter of law. See fflj 1 -2. The May 2003 Summary Judgment held that 
Gary Pahl owned all shares of the Loan Office at the time of his death. .See 
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Addendum Exhs. B, I. The Summary Judgment simply confirmed this; it did not 
affirmatively vest title because title had already been vested by operation of law 
and as a matter of fact. 
Lowe contends that notice requirements were not met in order to remove 
Lowe and Rose as officers and directors. Lowe offers no legal support or 
argument for this contention but only cites generally to Titles 75 and 78 of the 
Utah Code. The issue should therefore not be considered by the Court for Lowe's 
failure to adequately brief the subject. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health 
Ctr.. Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^ } 46 ("[The Court] may decline to review an argument 
imposing on [it] 'the burden of argument and research.'"). 
Notwithstanding, Ninow was not subject to any alleged notice requirements 
because removal was not done pursuant to any judicial action but pursuant to 
shareholder consent and action without meeting, which is allowed by statute. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-704. 
The Court's finding in Ninow I that Gary Pahl owned all 6,000 shares of 
stock at the time of his death inherently ratifies the Action by Shareholder Consent 
(see Tj 2) that removed Rose and Lowe as officers and directors of the Loan Office. 
This was properly accomplished pursuant to the Utah Code. Thus, a court order 
removing them was not necessary. Ultimately, any challenge of these matters is 
barred by the law of the case, failure to preserve the issue (in either Ninow 1 or in 
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this appeal), and by lack of standing since Lowe and Rose are not shareholders of 
the corporation. 
V. IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DENY LOWE'S 
MOTION FOR LIABILITY ON THE UNDERTAKING. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when seeking a temporary 
restraining order, a party must give security so that an adverse party will not 
"suffer costs, attorney fees or damage as the result of any wrongful order or 
injunction." Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(c)(l). Such security was provided when Ninow 
obtained a temporary restraining order, which was later converted to a preliminary 
injunction, against Lowe. 
In Ninow L this Court considered whether the trial court had properly found 
Lowe in contempt. The Court found that "Lowe's actions during the noon recess 
of the preliminary injunction hearing were not in violation of the TRO." Ninow v. 
Lowe. 2004 UT App 291. Subsequently in the trial court, Lowe attempted to 
recover against the surety, contending that this Court's finding that Lowe was not 
in violation of the TRO was tantamount to a finding that Lowe was wrongfully 
restrained. The trial court denied Lowe's motion. 
Lowe contends on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
impose liability on the surety pursuant to the surety's undertaking for damages in 
relation to the temporary restraining order. Lowe also contends that he 
29 
successfully eliminated any wrongful enjoinder through successful appellate 
reversal in Ninow I. These arguments misconstrue the prior rulings of both the 
trial court and this Court and are completely without merit. 
Contrary to Lowe's contention, in Ninow I the Court did not find that the 
TRO wrongfully enjoined Lowe; rather, the Court determined that Lowe was 
wrongfully found in contempt, and accordingly ordered Ninow to return the 
attorney's fees it had been awarded in the contempt action. This Court did not 
even consider the question of the propriety of the temporary restraining order or 
the preliminary injunction as those issues were not raised. 
As it has never been found that Lowe was wrongfully enjoined, it was 
proper for the Court to deny Lowe's Motion to impose liability on the surety 
pursuant to the surety's undertaking for damages in relation to the temporary 
restraining order. Lowe cannot take the trial court's wrongful finding of contempt 
and transform that into an alleged wrongful enjoinder. Neither the TRO nor the 
Preliminary Injunction have ever been found to be wrongful and this Court must 
therefore accept them as properly enjoining the named parties. 
Lowe also contends that it was error for the trial court to deny a hearing on 
the motion, but offers no legal support for this position. Contrary to Lowe's 
contention, there is nothing in Rule 65A that mandates the court hold a hearing in 
such a situation. 
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VI. THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE JUNE 12, 
2003, ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE NOVEMBER 26, 2002, DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT. 
Lowe and Rose were not parties to the default judgment and were not 
parties to the Diamond Fork case, the underlying case in which default was 
entered. See Diamond Fork Complaint, Addendum Exh.. D. That case was a 
purported shareholder derivative action brought by Diamond Fork Land Company, 
which purported to act as relator for the Loan Office. The only shareholder of the 
Loan Office at this time, however, was Ryan Pahl. This fact was affirmed in 
Ninow I. 
Diamond Fork was actually owned and controlled by Mr. Copier. See 19.1; 
Addendum Exh. B f^ 34. Mr. Copier is and was also legal counsel and counsel of 
record in the probate case for Lowe and possibly Rose. The Diamond Fork case 
was obviously an "end-around" attempt to gain control of the Loan Office shares. 
After all, Lowe and Rose's first attempt to gain control of the Loan Office shares 
failed when Judge Medley granted Ninow's motion for summary judgment as to 
the Loan Office shares on August 26, 2002. See f^ 11. 
Just eight days later, on September 3, 2002, Mr. Copier's company, 
Diamond Fork, filed the purported shareholder derivative action. In the Diamond 
Fork complaint, Diamond Fork claimed ownership of the Loan Office shares in 
precisely the same way Lowe and Rose had alleged- by relying on the "December 
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Agreement." See ^ 13, 17; Addendum Exhs. D, I. That attempt, along with other 
actions of Lowe, Rose and Mr. Copier, form the basis for Ninow's contempt 
proceedings before the trial court. See f 31. The Court lacks jurisdiction over the 
issue of the setting aside of the default judgment for the following reasons. 
A. Lowe and Rose4 lack standing to challenge the issue of the setting 
aside of the default judgment. 
Lowe and Rose do not have standing to challenge the setting aside of the 
default. Under the traditional test for standing, "the interests of the parties must be 
adverse" and "the parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in 
the controversy." Jones v. Barlow. 2007 UT 20, Tj 12 (citation omitted). Lowe and 
Rose cannot show any legally protectible interest in the default judgment. 
The only parties who benefit from the default judgment are the Bangkok 
Parties. See Addendum Exh. E. The parties to the Diamond Fork case are 
Diamond Fork Land Company (who moved to dismiss the case, based on lack of 
standing) and the Loan Office, which is owned by Ryan Pahl. Lowe and Rose 
have no absolutely no stake in the setting aside of the default judgment. Since 
Lowe and Rose lacks standing to claim error as to the setting aside of the June 12, 
2003, default judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction over that issue. 
4
 In the Docketing Statement, only appellant Rose asserts this issue on 
appeal. In any event, this same argument holds true for Lowe as well. 
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B. This court lacks jurisdiction over the setting aside of the default 
judgment for failure to timely appeal. 
After the default judgment was entered in the Diamond Fork case, Diamond 
Fork, the alleged relator, moved the trial court to dismiss the case based on lack of 
standing. See f^ 24; Addendum Exh. G. The case was then consolidated into the 
probate case in April 2004. See Tf 25. Judge Medley then granted Diamond Fork 
Land Company's Motion to Dismiss. See f^ 25; Addendum Exh. H. Any appeal of 
the setting aside of the default judgment should have been noticed within 30 days 
after the case was dismissed (which occurred on May 11, 2004). See Utah R. App. 
P. 4(a). 
This is because the order dismissing the Diamond Fork case was a final, 
appealable order as to the probate case in that it: 1) resolved an issue of vital 
importance (ownership of Loan Office shares), and 2) concluded a major phase in 
the probate (the purported shareholder derivative action). See In re Estate of 
Christensen, 655 P.2d 646, 648 (Utah 1982); In re Estate of Voorhees. 12 Utah 2d 
361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961). 
C. The issue of the setting aside of the default judgment was waived 
and/or not preserved for appeal. 
Even assuming, arguendo, Lowe has standing, Diamond Fork waived its 
objection to the setting aside of the default judgment when it moved to dismiss the 
case without the court hearing its motion to set aside the default judgment. m[l]n 
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order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.1" 
S.K. and J.K. v. State, 2007 UT App 67, f 7. By moving to dismiss the case (and 
the case later being dismissed pursuant thereto) Diamond Fork failed to preserve 
the issue for appeal because it never gave the trial court an opportunity to rule on 
its motion to vacate the setting aside of the default judgment. If Diamond Fork 
waived this issue, Lowe and Rose cannot simply revive it on appeal (or in the trial 
court) by suddenly advocating the setting aside, especially when they completely 
lack standing. 
VII. THE TRIAL COURT'S SETTING ASIDE OF THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Even if this Court has jurisdiction to consider the setting aside of the default 
judgment in the Diamond Fork case, the record shows this action should be 
affirmed an appeal. 
A. This Court may affirm the setting aside of the default judgment on 
any ground apparent on the record. 
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed 
from: 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the 
record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by 
the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true 
even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal 
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by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered 
or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bayles. 2002 UT 58, ]f 10 (citations omitted); see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal 
& Error § 714 (1993) ("Generally, the appellate court may affirm the judgment 
where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, 
regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopted by the trial court."); DeBry v. 
Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995) ("[a] party to an appeal does not have a 
constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on a particular ground.") 
B. The Default Judgment exceeds the scope of the relief prayed for in 
the Complaint and is therefore void. 
Utah Civil Rule of Procedure 54(c)(2) states that " A judgment by default 
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed 
for in the demand for judgment." The default judgment in the Diamond Fork case 
purports to vest title to 3000 shares of the Loan Office in the Bangkok Parties. 
Nowhere in the Diamond Fork complaint is this relief requested. See R. 4026, 
Addendum Exh. D. Diamond Fork requests specific performance of the 
"December Agreement" and an order requiring Ninow to transfer title to 3000 
shares of the Loan Office to Diamond Fork (other relief is claimed that is not at 
issue here). See Id. It was therefore improper and beyond the jurisdiction of the 
trial court to enter the default judgment, since it vested title to the Loan Office 
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shares in third parties not before the Court, rather than ordering Ninow to transfer 
the shares as requested in the Complaint. 
C. Ninow's interest and title in and to the Loan Office shares was never 
reached or attached by Lowe and Rose. 
The record shows that Lowe failed to execute upon the default judgment 
and attach Ninow's interests in the shares. Implicit in Lowe and Rose's attempts 
to advocate the effects of the default judgment is that the judgment itself vested 
title to the Loan Office share in the Bangkok Parties. It is axiomatic, however, 
that in order to effectuate a judgment, it must be enforced and executed upon. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 69(a) ("A writ of execution is available to a judgment creditor to 
satisfy a judgment or other order requiring the delivery of property or the payment 
of money by a judgment debtor."); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 n. 5 (Utah 1998) 
("core judicial functions include . . . the authority to enforce any valid judgment, 
decree or order". 
The only way Lowe and Rose could have reached Ninow's interest in the 
shares of stock, which are certificated securities, was to physically seize the 
certificates. Under Utah law, the interest of a debtor in a certificated security may 
be reached by a creditor only "by actual seizure of the security certificate by the 
officer making the attachment or levy . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-111(1) 
(2001); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 64C(e)(5). If the security is uncertificated, the 
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debtor's interest may only be attached "by legal process upon the issuer at its chief 
executive office in the United States . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-111(2) 
(2001). There is nothing in the record of Civil No. 020908627 to indicate that 
Lowe and Rose accomplished anything that would have attached the interests of 
the Loan Office shares so that they could then be transferred. 
D. The trial court's setting aside of the default judgment should be 
affirmed because the clerk entered judgment without first entering a 
default certificate. 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a), a party's default must be entered before default 
judgment is entered. If an application for default and proposed default certificate 
had been submitted and entered, those documents would have been entered in the 
docket. The docket for the Diamond Fork case indicates that an entry of default or 
default certificate was never entered by the clerk of the court. See R. 3813, 3815. 
Although the default judgment states that Ninow's default was entered, this 
is because counsel for Diamond Fork submitted the proposed default judgment 
and included this as a matter of form. Mr. Copier simply submitted a proposed 
default judgment without a request to enter a default certificate or a motion for 
default judgment. The court then mistakenly entered the default judgment for 
reasons unknown. This is supported by the docket, which states for November 25, 
2002: "Filed Order: Default Judgment," and then indicates that it was signed by 
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Judge Hilder. See R. 3813, 3815. This indicates the Order was submitted by 
itself, with no other documents. This also violates Rule 55 because the party 
seeking default must "apply to the court therefor." See Utah R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). 
There is no evidence Diamond Fork applied for default judgment. Because no 
entry of default was entered and no application for default judgment was made, the 
court lacked jurisdiction to enter default judgment and the default judgment is 
void. 
E. The trial court's setting aside of the default judgment should be 
affirmed because it was proper under Utah R. Civ. P. 60. 
The trial court's order setting aside of the default judgment in the Diamond 
Fork case was proper and should be affirmed. The trial court properly recognized 
that the default judgment was "improper or illegal, and voidable" because Ninow 
had not in fact "failed to plead or otherwise defend" at the time that the default 
judgment was entered. See Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a). The language of Rule 55(a) 
clearly does not allow an entry of default by the clerk of the court when a 
defendant has filed a responsive pleading. 
The trial court correctly relied upon R & B Land v. Klungervik to support 
the setting aside of the default judgment against Ninow since the entry of default 
was improper. See P & B Land v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277 (Ut. App. 1988) 
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(holding that where a court improperly enters a certificate of default, a subsequent 
default judgment based on that improper entry is voidable). As Judge Hilder 
pointed out: "It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable if 
the court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because the 
defendant did not comply strictly with a three month deadline." See Addendum 
Exh. F. 
Furthermore, the setting aside of the Default Judgment should stand because 
the three month deadline for moving the court on that matter does not apply in this 
case. Rule 60(b)(6) states that such a motion for relief "shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken." There is no finding in the 
record that the Rule 60 motion was not made within a reasonable time. 
Lowe suggests that Ninow's basis to set aside the default judgment was 
Rule 60(b)(1), mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The 
"mistake" provision in Rule 60(b)(1), however, provides for the reconsideration of 
judgments only where: (1) a party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an 
attorney in the litigation has acted without authority from a party, or (2)... the 
judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order. 
Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996)(emphasis 
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added)(citation omitted). Here, the mistake in question is neither one made by a 
party or attorney, nor is it a substantive mistake of law or fact and therefore does 
not properly fall within the confines of Rule 60(b)(1). 
Thus, The trial court's reliance on Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the Default 
Judgment was proper because the court's obvious mistake clearly falls within the 
language of uany other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 
Additionally, The trial court's setting aside of the Default Judgment is 
supported by Rule 60(a), which allows the setting aside based on u[c]lerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders and other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its 
own initiative . . . ."). 
The setting aside is also proper under Oseguera v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange. 2003 UT App 46. In that case, this Court concluded that 
When the trial court's mistakes - not counsel's - are the reason a 
judgment is improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, 
even if it remains undetected for some time, the court should be 
anxious to do whatever needs to be done to fix the mistake as soon as 
it is called to the court's attention. 
Lowe mistakenly distinguishes Oseguera from the instant case on the basis that in 
order for the court to set aside a judgment under 60(b)(6), the moving party must 
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have been "actually misled" by the court. However, as Oseguera plainly states, 
this is only true when the relief from judgment is sought specifically "for a lack of 
notice." Id. at TJ 9. Here, "lack of notice" was not the reason relief was requested 
under Rule 60(b)(6), rather it is being sought as a result of an improper entry of 
default made by the court. Thus, the general holding of Oseguera as stated above 
readily applies here. JdL at f 12. 
VIII. NINOW SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND ATTORNEYS 
FEES INCURRED FOR THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Ninow should be awarded her costs and attorneys fees herein as this is 
clearly a frivolous appeal and is brought for the improper purpose of harassment 
and unnecessarily increasing the cost of litigation. Lowe and Rose's arguments, 
with the exception of those under Osegura, and possibly very few other 
exceptions, are not ground in fact, not warranted by existing law, and not based on 
a good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law. Also, Ninow 
should be awarded attorneys fees for Lowe and Rose's failure to meet briefing 
requirements under Utah R. App. P. 24. 
A. Lowe and Rose submitted an Order on a Petition in which they had no 
interest and then appealed from that Order claiming error. 
Lowe and Rose, by and through their counsel, have orchestrated this appeal 
by first submitting a final order on the May 29, 2002, Petition in August 2005, in 
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the midst of the contempt proceedings. Lowe and Rose had absolutely no interest 
remaining in the Petition. The Loan Office issues had been resolved long ago and 
they expressly disclaimed any interest in the State Street Property. See 
Addendum Exh. N. Submitting the Final Order was done ostensibly for the 
purpose of relieving them from the effects of the preliminary injunction, which 
expired only upon resolution of such Petition. See fflf 3, 7.2, 7.3, 37; Addendum 
Exhs. A, L. 
Further evidence of Lowe and Rose's bad faith is that after submitting the 
final order on a Petition in which they had no interest, they now contend 
provisions of such order were entered in error! They now wish to be "reinstated" 
as officers and directors of the Loan Office, even though they were not officers 
and directors just prior to entry of the purported August 2005 Final Order. 
The August 25, 2005, Final Order contains the blatant misrepresentation 
that Ninow had "admitted by written filing dated July 8, 2005, that she will not 
pursue the merits of her May 29, 2002, petition beyond the May 1, 2003, order 
granting summary judgment...." See Addendum Exh. L. 
The filing by Ninow dated July 8, 2005, is a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion for Stay. See Addendum Exh. O. That memorandum does not contain the 
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admission or statement by Ninow as claimed in the August 16, 2005, Final Order. 
See Id. 
It is obvious from the record that Ninow and even Lowe and Rose continued 
to litigate the May 29, 2002, Petition beyond May 1, 2003. Ninow filed a motion 
for summary judgment regarding ownership of the real estate on May 21, 2004. 
See ^ 44. Lowe and Rose themselves actually litigated the issue by filing a 
Memorandum Opposing the Summary Judgment Motion and even filed a Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the State Street Property issue. See Tf 
44. 
Lowe and Rose continued to litigate in the probate case after final resolution 
of the Loan Office shares even though they expressly disclaimed any ownership in 
the real estate. See Addendum Exh. N. The real estate issues were the only 
pending issues under the May 29, 2002, Petition. 
In the August 2005 Final Order, Lowe and Rose also purport to "remove" 
themselves as officers and directors of the Loan Office. See Addendum Exh. L. 
They could not have been removed, however, because they had already been 
removed by shareholder consent in May of 2002. See 12 , 2.1. This is an 
egregious misuse of the legal system, a frivolous action, and obviously done for 
improper purposes. 
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There is no ground in fact or law that can support Lowe and Rose's attempt 
to remove themselves as officers and directors of the Loan Office after they had 
already been removed several years earlier, and then complaining of it on appeal 
seeking to be reinstated as such. Ninow should therefore be awarded her costs and 
attorneys fees on appeal. 
B. Lowe and Rose clearly have no interest in the Diamond Fork default 
judgment yet continue to advocate setting it aside. 
The Diamond Fork case was clearly a sham from its inception. The trial 
court ruled summarily in August 2002 that the Loan Office shares were not subject 
to the December Agreement and that they were the decedent's property at the time 
of his death. Conveniently, just eight days later, shares of the Loan Office 
happened to have been transferred to Diamond Fork, which also conveniently is 
owned and controlled by Mr. Copier. Diamond Fork also claims ownership of the 
shares under the December Agreement, which had just been rejected by the trial 
court as having not been fulfilled. 
The default judgment then vests title to shares in the Bangkok Parties, who 
are not parties to this appeal and never appeared in the probate or Diamond Fork 
case. Sometime later, Diamond Fork admits that it lacks standing, and Lowe and 
Rose soon begin to advocate the setting aside of the default judgment. Lowe and 
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Rose, by and through their attorney, come before this Court and ask to set aside a 
default judgment, when they have specific knowledge that: 1) the Loan Office 
shares have been undisputably held to be owned by Ryan Pahl; 2) the December 
Agreement, upon which the Diamond Fork case was based, has been specifically 
rejected by the trial court and this Court in Ninow I: 3) the default judgment 
improperly provided that they would be returned to the board of directors when 
Ninow had them removed as directors in May of 2002. 
Lowe and Rose's attempts to set aside the default judgment is clearly an 
improper attempt to somehow gain control of the Loan Office. This, along with 
the actions described above are an improper use of this Court's resources and 
should not be tolerated. 
C. Lowe and Rose failed to provide a factual or legal basis for 
recovering on the TRO undertaking or finding the May 2003 
Summary Judgment was a "full" summary judgment. 
Lowe and Rose also have no factual or legal basis for recovering on the 
TRO undertaking. Lowe has failed to point out any place in the record where 
Lowe is found to have been wrongfully restrained. He has provided no legal 
support for the proposition that a party should recover against a TRO undertaking 
when they merely were wrongfully found to be in contempt of such TRO. 
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Lowe and Rose also contend the May 2003 summary judgment was a ufull" 
summary judgment that disposed of all issues under the May 29, 2002, Petition 
and therefore ended the probate litigation and absolved them of any further 
liability under the Preliminary Injunction. They offer no legal support for this and 
accordingly ask this Court to disregard the plain facts of the case, which they 
themselves litigated the May 2002 Petition beyond the entry of summary 
judgment. Ninow should therefore be awarded her fees in this appeal. 
D. Ninow should also be awarded her fees for Lowe and Rose's failure 
to observe appellate briefing requirements. 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure contains unambiguous 
requirements for a briefs organization and contents. Failure to adhere to these 
requirements "increases the costs of litigation for both parties and unduly burdens 
the judiciary's time and energy." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 1{ 11 (citation 
omitted). Failure to adhere to the requirements may invite the Court to impose 
serious consequences, such as disregarding or striking the briefs, or assessing 
attorney fees against the offending lawyer. Id. (citing Utah R. App. P. 24(j)). 
The fact that Lowe and Rose failed to include a summary of arguments is 
the least of concerns. The statement of issues, along with the remainder of the 
brief, is convoluted, verbose, rambling, and an incredibly tedious read. The 
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statement of facts contains only five paragraphs with scattered references to the 
record. The only section that resembles traditional legal argument and analysis 
with support by citations to proper legal authority is that dealing with the 
Oseguera issue. 
This lack of organization and clarity has placed a tremendous burden of 
factual and legal research on Ninow. Ninow presumes this Court will face a 
similar burden. Ninow has spent many hours simply trying to figure out what 
exactly Lowe and Rose's assignment of error is here on appeal and any logical or 
legal reasoning behind such assignments of error. Their lack of citation to the 
record for factual assertions is perhaps most frustrating and time consuming to 
rectify. Because Lowe and Rose's brief does not meet appellate briefing standards 
as set forth in Green, Ninow respectfully requests that she be awarded her 
attorneys fees incurred for this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, Ninow respectfully requests that the 
actions of the trial court be affirmed, that she be awarded her attorneys fees and 
double costs on appeal, and that this matter be remanded to the trial court to 
resolve the contempt proceedings and so that Ninow may seek sanctions if she so 
desires and resolve current sanctions issues against Lowe, Rose and their attorney. 
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In the alternative, Ninow requests that this appeal be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
DATED this w < \ day of March, 2007. 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
Hala fcr. Afu 
Attorneys for Ninow 
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020908627) - June 12, 2003 (R. 4053) 
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M. Minutes of April 6, 2005, Hearing - April 6, 2005 (R. 2555) 
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Daniel F. Van Woerkom USB #8500 
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VAN WOERKOM & CONDDE, LC 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6195 
Facsimile-(801) 363-4850 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY 
GARY G. PAHL INJUNCTION 
Deceased. 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which are incorporated herein by 
reference as set forth in its entirety 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: 
1. That William T Lowe, Augusta Rose and Robert K Mortensen are restrained and prohibited 
from entering the business premises occupied and owned by Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc ("Loan Office"), located at 1588 & 1594 South State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah 
2. William T. Lowe, Augusta Rose, Robert K. Mortensen and any of their agents, servants, 
employees, officers, directors, attorneys, and all those acting in concert with them, ate 
ordered to immediately turn over to Ms Ninow or her attorneys ail documents, records, 
mpmnranda inventory kevs to the nremises comnuter files eauinment bankine records. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG ifr 2002 
R A L M C E COUNTY 
' "" /rrY Oeputy Clerk 
checkbooks, passbooks, and all other like items pertaining to the Loan Office or to the 
management of the real property located at 1588 & 1594 South State Street in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and shall immediately desist from conducting any further activities purportedly 
on behalf of the Loan Office or as managers) of the aforementioned real estate. 
3. William T. Lowe, Augusta Rose and Robert K. Mortensen are expressly prohibited from 
disbursing, dissipating, transferring, encumbering, or paying any monies to themselves or 
any person or entity fiora any account held publicly or privately by the Loan Office or any 
entity purporting to manage the real estate located at 1588 & 1594 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 
4. Any peace officer of this into whose hands this Order may come, is directed to take any 
action reasonably necessary to enforce the above provisions of this Court's Order. 
This order shall be deemed to take effect, nunc pro tunc, as of May 30,11:00 a m and shall continue 
until further order of the Court or until an ultimate determination on the merits of KaLynn Ninow's 
underlying Petition For Determination of Ownership for Shares of Stock and Interests in Real Estate 
filed with this Court 
ENTERED this day of June, 2002. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the££ day of June 2002,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to 
the following: 
Robert Copier J-/*^f-~2>J;s*rJ %-$ > ^ b«2_ 
Attorney for William T. Lowe and Grand Staircase Land Company 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2803 
Jay W. Taylor 
P.O. Box 901340 
Sandy, Utah 84090 
FAX: 943-0994 
James McConkie, HI 
Attorney for Robert K. Mortensen 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Augusta Rose 
1363 East 4170 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
C^jss^felsllii^ 
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Daniel F. Van Woerkom USB #8500 
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VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE, LC 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6195 
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARYG.PAHL FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Deceased. RE: Summary Judgment 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26, 2002 based on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of 
the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator 
for Ryan B. Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl. Also, the court considered the motions 
for competing motions for summary judgment filed by Mr. Copier on behalf of his clients 
Appearing at the hearing was KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, Van 
Woerkom & Condie, LC, William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier. 
The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and being otherwise fully and sufficiently 
" m -1 2KB 
SMKJAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
advised hereby enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Articles of Incorporation of the Loan Office (attached to Ninow Affidavit as Exhibit 
"1") provide for sixty thousand dollars of capital stock to be authorized and divide the sixty 
thousand dollars into six thousand shares of common voting stock with a par value often dollars 
per share. 
2. Article II, Section 1 of the Bylaws of Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. ("Loan Office") 
attests to the same number and value of shares, stating, 'The aggregate number of shares of 
Capital Stock is 6,000 shares with the par value of $10.00 per share." Moreover, the shares 
cannot be divided into classes "and all stock of the corporation shall be of the same class and 
have the same rights." 
3. Shareholders also have no pre-emptive right to acquire additional shares of stock in the 
corporation. Thus, only one class containing a maximum number of six thousand shares of 
common voting stock in the Loan Office can be issued and outstanding. 
4. The Articles of Incorporation of the Loan Office have never at any time been amended to 
allow more than six thousand (6,000) shares of capital stock to be authorized. 
5. On March 3, 1984, a stock was issued to A. Gunther Pahl ("Gunther") as holder pf three 
thousand shares of the capital stock of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. 
6. After Gunther's death on February 24, 1996, his three thousand shares passed to his 
surviving wife, Beverly Jean Pahl, via their joint will. The will was executed on May 7, 1981, 
and stated in part,"We [A. Gunther and Beverly Pahl] give, devise and bequeath to each other, 
respectively, all of such right, title and interest as we respectively hold, possess and enjoy in and 
to our personal and real property which we own or may own, hereby giving and devising all of 
the personal and real property of the one who may die first to the survivor." 
7. On June 22, 1996, Beverly Pahl assigned Gunther's three thousand shares lo her son, 
Gary G. Pahl. In the letter of assignment, Beverly Pahl stated that it was the intent of the late A. 
Gunther Pahl to leave his full interest in the shares to Gary G. Pahl. Beverly Pahl further stated 
that she received Gunther's three thousand shares instead of Gary G.Pahl via the joint will 
because Gunther Pahl never took the necessary measures to insuie his intent would be legally 
carried out. In addition, Beverly Pahl stated that because "[i]t is also my desire for our son, Gary 
Gunther Pahl, to fully own the fifty percent (50%) interest in PAUL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC., I hereby assign and transfer unto Gary Gunther Pahl, three thousand (3,000) 
shares represented by the attached certificate." 
8. Five of Gary G. Pahl's sisters and Lowe signed as witnesses to the assignment. As drafter 
of the assignment and a witness, Lowe must have recognized Gunther Pahl as the owner of three 
thousand shares in the Loan Office at the time of his death, and that the shares had passed to 
Beverly Pahl via the joint will and then to Gary G. Pahl by assignment 
9. On May 6, 1998, Frank H, Pahl and Gary G. Pahl both signed a Bill of Sale drafted by 
Lowe, which stated in part, "It is my [Frank H. Pahl's] desire to sell my full interest in Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc. to Gary G. Pahl. My full interest consists of 3,000 shares . . . . Upon 
successful completion of this Bill of Sale, my [Frank H Pahl's] 3,000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace 
Loan Office, Inc. will belong to Gaiy G. Pahl. The three thousand shares amount to fifty percent 
(50%) of the business. William T. Lowe is holding the three thousand-share certificates until 
this Bill of Sale is fulfilled in whole." In addition to the signatures of Frank R Pahl and Gary G. 
Pahl, Lowe signed the Bill o,f Sale as a witness. 
10. The purchase price for Frank Pahl's 3000 shares was $96,000.00. 
11. The Bill of Sale called for a down payment of $46,000 00 and Frank Pahl agreed to carry 
a note on the remaining $50,000 00 which was to be repaid monthly at the rate of $1,000.00. 
12. The Bill of Sale also indicates that "Upon successful completion of this Bill of Sale, my 
3,000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. will belong to Gary G. Pahl." 
13. Gary Pahl did pay the $46,000.00 down payment, and made monthly payments as 
required. The payment schedule was accelerated and completely paid in full as of April 17,2000. 
14. Attesting to the fact that he had been paid in full for the 3,000 shares of stock, on March 
13, 2002, Frank H Pahl signed a Ratification of Payment for Bill of Sale Dated May 6, 1998, 
acknowledging and ratifying that said Bill of Sale was paid in full by Gary G. Pahl before his 
date of death. 
15. The acceleration of the payment schedule took place because Frank H. Pahl entered into a 
subsequent Bill of Sale dated September 25, 2000 to transfer Frank's interest in the buildings 
located at 1588 and 1594 South State Street, Salt Lake City Utah to the Loan Office. Before 
Frank would allow the sale of his interest in the buildings to go through, he insisted that Gary 
pay him in full for his stock in the Loan Office. To meet Frank's demands, Gary refinanced his 
home and obtained a $10,000.00 loan from his mother, Beverly Pahl. The money from the 
refinancing and the loan was used to pay Frank in fuIJ for his stock. Therefore; pursuant to the 
terms of the May 6, 1998 Bill of Sale and its "successful completion", said three thousand shares 
belonged to Gary G. Pahl at'the date of his death. 
16. Frank H. Pah] has never at any time sold, transferred, devised, bequeathed or assigned 
any of his shares to any person other than to sell the said three thousand (3,000) shares to Gary 
G. Pahl via the said Bill of Sal? referenced above. 
17. Additionally, Frank H. Pahl has never at any time appointed or designated an agent or 
ratified any agent's actions to purportedly sell the said three thousand (3,000) shares to any other 
person. He is also unaware of any person ever attempting to claim that they have sold Frank's 
shares on his behalf or of any person attempting to claim that they have acquired Frank's shares 
either directly or through an agent or other transaction. 
18. As previously established, Gary G. Pahl passed away on June 25, 2000. On September 6, 
2000, the Third Judicial Court appointed KaLynn Ninow Personal Representative of Gary G. 
PahTs estate and decreed that Gary G. Pahl died intestate. 
19. Pursuant to the laws of intestacy under the Uniform Probate Code, all'property in Gary G. 
Pahl's estate passed to his son Ryan B. Pahl, as sole heir (devisee). See U.C.A.§ 75-2-106(2). 
20. On May 15, 2002, KaLynn Ninow, holding legal title to the 6,000 shares of common 
stock of the Loan Office executed a shareholder action by consent in accordance with Utah Code 
Annotated §16-10a-704, which was sent certified mail along with other documents to William T. 
Lowe, Augusta Rose and Robert Mortensen and Robert Copier on or about May 23, 2002. 
(Certificate of Service, filed May 23,2002). 
21. The action by shareholder consent removes Lowe, Rose and Mortensen as officers and 
directors and names Ryan Pahl, KaLynn Ninow and Richard Ninow as directors of the 
corporation. Ryan B. Pahl was subsequently elected/appointed as President and Treasurer, 
Richard Dean Ninow as Vice President, and KaLynn Ninow as Secretary. 
22. On May 20, 2002, a Temporary Restraining Order was issued which required that 
"William T. Lowe, Augusta Rose, Robert K. Mortensen and any of their agents, servants, 
employees, officers, directors, attorneys, and all those acting in concert with them, are ordered to 
immediately turn over to Ms. Ninow or her attorneys all documents, records, memoranda, 
inventory, keys to the premises, computer files, equipment, banking records, checkbooks, 
passbooks, and all other like items pertaining to the Loan Office or to the management of the real 
property located at 1588 & 1594 South State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and shall 
immediately desist from conducting any further activities purportedly on behalf of the Loan 
Office or as manager(s) of the aforementioned real estate." 
23, On May 23, 2002, William T. Lowe caused 35 pages of material to be turned over to 
Damian E. Davenport. A representative of Mr. Lowe indicated to Mr, Davenport that those 35 
documents constituted "all that they had." 
24. At the beginning of the hearing on KaLynn Ninow's motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
Mr. Lowe again represented to the Court through his attorney, Robert Copier, that he had turned 
over all of the corporate documents which were in his possession. 
25. Mr. Copier also stated that he did not represent PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and 
that he only represented Mr. Lowe. 
26. On May 27, 2002, William T. Lowe, Robert Mortensen and Augusta Rose each signed a 
"Response to Order to Show Cause" which also contained a brief "Argument in Opposition to 
Injunction." 
27. Seven documents were attached to the aforementioned Response to Order to Show 
Cause. The first document, entitled "Amendment of By-Laws of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc." and purportedly signed by Gary Pahl and William T. Lowe, was found by the Court to be a 
forgery and a fraud based upon the testimony of George Throckmorton. 
28. The second document attached to the Response to Order to Show Cause was entitled 
"Bill of Sale Agreement" and bore the date of December 28, 1998. Lowe, Mortensen and Rose 
indicate in their signed response that under the terms of this document "Gary G. Pahl sold, and 
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., purchased, the 3000 shares of common stock originally 
owned by Frank Pahl, leaving Gary G. Pahl with only 3000 shares at death." 
29. According to the terms of the agreement, Gary had paid $53,000.00 to Frank Pahl for the 
purchase. This amount was to be repaid to Gary by the corporation at the rate of $700.00 per 
month beginning January 10,1999 until paid in full. 
30. The corporation did not and has not reimbursed either Gary or his estate for the purchase 
of the shares acquired from Frank Pahl back into the treasury of the corporation. Additionally, 
when the payment schedule to Frank was accelerated in the spring of 2000, the money to pay 
Frank in full came from Gary's personal funds, and not the funds of the corporation. None of the 
requirements or conditions precedent of the December 28, 1998 Bill of Sale Agreement which 
would have transferred Gary's shares into the treasury of the corporation have ever been met. 
31. Minutes of alleged Board of Directors Meetings were also submitted, which purported to 
transfer the 3000 shares referred to in the preceding paragraph to William T. Lowe, who one 
week later purported to transfer said shares equally between Rose and Mortensen. 
32. On June 4, 2002, following the issuance of the Preliminary Injunction referred to above, 
Robert Copier, attorney for William T. Lowe, filed with the Court a "Stock Transfer Notice and 
Request for Notice" purporting to transfer 3000 shares of stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., (1500 transferred outright and 1500 held in escrow by William T. Lowe) to a Utah 
corporation known as "Grand Staircase Land Company, Inc." 
33. On July 5,2002, Robert Copier filed another "Notice Regarding A Transfer of Corporate 
Shares of Stock" purporting to give notice that 1500 shares of stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan 
Office Inc., had been transferred from Grand Staircase Land Company to "Diamond Fork Land 
Company/' 
34. A "Certified Copy of the Entire File" from the Utah Department of Commerce, 
demonstrates that Robert Copier is the only officer and the only director of both Diamond Fork 
Land Company, and Grand Staircase Land Company. 
35. Section 5 of the By-Laws of PahFs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., reads as follows: 
"Sections. TRANSFER OF STOCK. The shares of the corporation shall be transferable only 
on the books of the corporation upon surrender of the certificate or certificates representing the 
same, properly endorsed by the registered holder or by his duly authorized attorney, such 
endorsement or endorsements to be witnessed by one witness. The requirement for such 
witnessing may be waived in writing upon the form or endorsement by the President of the 
corporation." 
36. No corporate stock transfer ledger or certificates or any kind of document purporting to 
give a history of transfers of the corporation's stock have been provided by Lowe, Rose or 
Mortensen. Despite diligent searches of the offices and records located at PahTs Salt Palace 
Loan Office, no such document or ledger has been located. Additionally, no other coiporate 
documents, certificates or records of any kind have been turned over by Lowe, Rose or 
Mortensen. 
37. Gary G. Pahl owned 6,000 shares of stock in PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., when 
he passed away on June 25, 2000, having acquired 3000 shares from his Jate father, A. Gunther 
Pahl, and the remaining 3,000 shares from his uncle, Frank H. Pahl. 
38. The Court finds that Gary Pahl entered into a "Bill of Sale" agreement dated May 6,1998 
for the purchase of 3,000 shares from his uncle Frank H. Pahl. 
39. The Court finds that the terms of the May 6,1998 agreement are not ambiguous, and can 
therefore be interpreted as a matter of law. 
40. Gary Pahl had completely paid for Frank's 3,000 shares as of April 17,2000, and had 
thereby successfully completed the terms of the Bill of Sale. The provisions of the Bill of Sale 
explicitly state that "[U]pon successful corapletion of this Bill of Sale, my 3,000 shares of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. will belong to Gary Pahl." Therefore, as of April 17,2000, Gary 
Pahl was the owner of Frank Pahl's 3,000 shares of stock. 
41. Several of the Respondents in this case, William T. Lowe, Grand Staircase Land 
Company, Diamond Fork Land Company, and Augusta Rose, have attempted to cast doubt or 
question the legal, if not beneficial, ownership of the shares of stock Gaiy acquired from his 
uncle Frank. In making this attempt, these individuals and entities make several inconsistent 
claims. 
42. The Bill of Sale provides that "The three thousand shares amount to fifty percent (50%) 
of the business. William T. Lowe is holding the three thousand-share certificates until this Bill 
of Sale is fulfilled in whole." The individuals and entities cited in the preceding paragraph have 
attempted to rely on the language quoted above to assert that William T. Lowe held legal title to 
the shares of stocklFthe time of Gary Pahl's death, since Mr. Lowe has indicated via his 
attorney in pleadings filed with the Court that he never "conveyed" the shares of stock back to 
Gary Pahl before his death. 
43, This Court finds that the issue of whether or in what capacity Mr. Lowe is purported to 
have "held" the shaies is moot As soon as the payments had been made under the Bill of Sale, 
the ownership of the shares vested in Gary Pahl 
44. William Lowe had no power or authority to retain the shares in any way once the Bill of 
Sale had been completed. 
45. The only documentation in existence evidencing the sale of stock from Frank Pahl to 
Gary Pahl is the Bill of Sale dated May 6, 1998 and the cancelled checks and accounting records 
evidencing payment. The stock was never transferred on the books of the corporation, and no 
Certificate of Shares was ever executed either by Frank or Gary Pahl or William Lowe or anyone 
else. 
46. The allegations of non-conveyance by Mr. Lowe back to Gary Pahl are moot. This Court 
has, and does find that according to the Bill of Sale, the shares were the property of Gary Pahl as 
of April 17,2000, several months prior to his death. 
47. With respect to the December 28, 1998 "Bill of Sale Agreement," this Court finds that 
the terms of said agreement are unambiguous and may be interpreted as a matter of law. 
48. The Court finds that the terms were never completed, and that the 3,000 shares of stock 
which Gary Pahl acquired from Frank Pahl never became "treasury" shares of the corporation. 
49. There are two material requirements under the December 28,1998 Bill of Sale 
Agreement (the 'Treasury Stock Agreement") which had to be met before any of Gary PahPs 
stock would become property of the corporate treasury. First, "the fifty-three thousand dollars 
($53,000.) paid to Frank Pah] by Gary Pahl will be reimbursed to Gary Pahl at the rate of seven 
hundred dollars ($700.) per month, without interest, until the Corporation pays the total amount 
back to Gary Pahl. Payments to Gary Pahl to begin on January 10, 1999 and the same date each 
month until paid in full" The second requirement was "[A]lso, the Corporation will assume the 
balance due to Frank Pahl, per the Bill of Sale dated May 6, 1998, at the terms and conditions as 
outlined therein." 
50. The express terms of the Treasury Stock Agreement provide that "upon successful 
completion of this agreement, Frank PahPs 3,000 shaies will belong to the treasury of the 
Corporation, leaving a balance of 3,000 common stock shares outstanding." 
51. The payment provisions were conditions precedent to the "successful completion" of the 
agreement, and therefore, full and final payment was a condition precedent to the shares 
becoming treasury stock. 
52. Payments to Gary under the agreement were to begin on January 10,1999 and continue 
thereafter until the $53,000.00 had been repaid. At the rate of $700.00 per month, it would have 
taken approximately 75.7 months to repay the $53,000.00. If payments had begun in January, 
1999, it would have taken until approximately May, 2005 to repay the obligation. However, 
when the payments would have been completed is moot, since it is undisputed that neither Gary 
nor his Estate have ever received any payments under the Treasury Stock Agreement. 
53. As to the second condition precedent, the money paid to Frank Pahl under the accelerated 
payment schedule came from the personal fimds of Gary Pahl, not the corporation. 
54. Payment was not made according to the terms of the Treasury Stock Agreement. The 
Treasury Stock Agreement was never successfully completed and the shares of stock acquired 
from Frank Pahl could not have become treasury stock, either prior to, or following Gary PahTs 
death. Therefore, there was no treasury stock in existence for Augusta Rose and Robert 
Mortensen to convey to William Lowe on August 25,2000, and the subsequent "transfers" have 
all been void ab initio. It was impossible for them to transfer what did not, and does not exist, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court concludes that as a matter of 
law, that Gary Pahl had acquired A. Gunther PahFs 3,000 shares of PahTs Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc., by assignment from Beverly Pahl as of June 22, 1996, and further finds that Gary 
Pahl had acquired Frank PahTs 3,000 shares of stock in PahPs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., as 
of April 17,2000, and that Gary Pahl owned all 6,000 shares of the corporation at the time of his 
death. 
2, Neither Gary Pahl nor his Estate was ever compensated as required under the December 
28,1998 Bill of Sale Agreement (the 'Treasury Slock Agreement'7). According to the express 
terms of the agreement, the stock never became treasury stock of the corporation, and the 
subsequent "transfers" have all been void ab initio. 
3. The Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Pahl is entitled to summary judgment 
as a matter of law, declaring that Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's 
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., at the time of his death, and further that all of those 6,000 shares 
are part of the property belonging to the Estate of Gary Pahl, and to Ryan Pahl as the only 
devisee of the Estate. 
DATED, this the / day of 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the<2L_ day of y&PsA 2003,1 caused to be matfedrpestage . 
prepaid, a true and correct Copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Robert Copier 
Attorney for William T. Lowe, Grand Staircase Land Company, Diamond Fork Land Company 
and Augusta Rose 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2&03 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Deceased. 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26,2002 based on the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of 
the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator 
for Ryan B. Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl. Also, the court considered the motions 
for competing motions for summary judgment filed by Mr. Copier on behalf of his clients. 
Appearing at the hearing was KaLynn Niriow, represented by and through counsel, Van 
Woerkoni & Condie, LC, William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier, 
who appeared on behalf of his clients The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel and 
Oepuiy Clerk 
being otherwise fully and sufficiently advised, and having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Personal Representative of the Estate of 
Gary Pahl is GRANTED. 
2. Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of PahFs Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., at the time of his death, and all of said 6,000 shares are part of the property belonging to the 
Estate of Gary Pahl, and to Ryan Pahl as the only devisee of the Estate. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^2, day of Affil 2003,1 caused to be 
prcpaid -^a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: ' i 
Robert Copier 
Attorney for William T. Lowe, Grand Staircase Land Company, Diamond Fork Land Company 
and Augusta Rose 
200 Metro Place 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2803 
TabD 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
TN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
:OMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
YNN NiNUVV, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary G. Pahl, deceased, and 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL'S SALT PLACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND LAND FORK 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAYLYNN N1NOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
(Jury G. Pahl, deceased, and 
individually, 
Defendant 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision, The 
parlies briefed (he original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which time the court 
indicnled that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred, 
but lh<;U there might be grounds to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule 
55, the underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P A B Land v. Klungervik, 751 l\2d 
274 (Ul, App, 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the 
issue raised by the court. Now, having reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules 
as follows; 
First, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v. Box Elder Courtly and Trembly 
v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the 
couit is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment has entered based on 
the court's bench ruling of May 2,2003. 
That is, the court is stili persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or 
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any 
one of the Jirsl three snbseoiiom, the time limit is throe months, and the court has no discretion to 
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RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 020908627 
Judge Robert K. ITiJder 
extend that time, 
But, the court is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah 
Court of Appeals decision, Osagucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchange^ 2003 UT App 46 
(February 21, 2003), that Rule 60(b)(6), URC1\ provides a clear basis for relief from the default 
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under the first three subsections. As the 
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default 
results solely from court error, probably even more manifestly than was the case in OsQgucra. 
Notwithstanding plaintiff s assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading 
was lale, fll Hie date the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date 
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been 
filed. The responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the 
court's fault, ' The critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend" (Rule 
55(a), UUCP) at the time the default was sought, 
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no 
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and 
voidable," 751 P,2d at 277. It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable 
if the court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did 
not comply strictly with a three month deadline, That is particularly true when, as hero, the 
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plaintiff did 
not give prompt notice of the judgment. 
'Hie court still believes there may he a basis to sol aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP, 
under facts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors, 
particularly in light of the direction given by the Osoguera court: 
When the trial court's mislakes-not oounsePs-are the reason a judgment is 
improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected 
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the 
mislakc as soon as it is called to the court's attention. 
Id a tPaiul2, 
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6), 
URC1\ and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable 
time after becoming aware of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases. 
I'or ll ic foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is 
]
 Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a 
subject of another motion. 
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GRANTED and the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading to which 
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks 
consolidation of this case with the earlier filed case before Judge Medley, that Motion must be 
diroeled lo Judge Medley, This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further 
Order is required. 




ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for the Relator 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary Pahl, deceased. 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 020908627 
Judge Robert Hilder 
Relator, Diamond Fork Land Company, respectfully moves the court to 
dismiss this action without prejudice. This motion is made on the ground that as a 
result of recent transfers of shares in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., relator is 
no longer a beneficial shareholder of that corporation ^ nd now lacks any standing. 
This motion is supported by/a-memorandum.i 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2 0 R 
<k 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City UT84MTT 
DATED this 12th day of Match, 200 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 ^ ' ^ ' 2 PH 5* 0 3 
Attorney for the Relator ,^ QisTRIC 
17 East 400 South b/vJ LAKE COUNTY 
Salt Lake City, U tah 84111 BY 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL'S SALT PALACE LOAN MEMORANDUM 
OFFICE, INC., a Utah corporation, IN SUPPORT OF THE 
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND MOTION TO DISMISS 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KALYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gaiy Pahl, deceased. Civil No. 020908627 
Defendant. 
Judge Robert Hilder 
The relator, Diamond Fork Land Company, has moved the court to dismiss 
this action without prejudice. The motion has been made on the ground that as a 
result of recent transfers of shares in PahVs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., relator is 
no longer a beneficial shareholder of that corporation and now lacks any standing. 
This memorandum supports the motion. 
This is a derivative shareholder action brought by Diamond Fork Land 
Company [asserting that it is a beneficial shareholder of PahTs Salt Palace Loan 
Office, Inc. ("the corporation")] asserting the corporation's rights As a result of 
recent transfers of shares, Diamond Fork Land Company no longer asserts that it 
is a beneficial shareholder of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and therefore 
claims no standing to continue to pursue this action on behalf of the corporation. 
Therefore, this action should now be dismissed without prejudice, since it is 
also defendant's position that relator lacksstarking to bring this derivative action. 
DATED this 12th day of Mar/h, 2004. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A true copy hereof was this-day mailed to: 
David C. Condie 
Attorney at Law 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake CitytTB 84111 
DATED this 12th day of March, 2004. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN OFFICE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, ex 
rel., DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
KALYNN NINOW, personal 
representative of the estate of 
Gary Pahl, deceased, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 020908627 
Plaintiff Diamond Fork Land Company's Motion to Dismiss is 
submitted to the Court for decision pursuant to Rule 7, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Having reviewed plaintiff's unopposed 
Memorandum in support, the Court rules as follows: 
1. Plaintiff Diamond Fork Land Company's Motion to Dismiss 
without prejudice is granted in full as prayed for. 
2. This signed Minute Entry shall constitute the Order of 
the Court resolving the matter referenced herein, no further Order 
is required. 
Dated this '' day of May, 20^4 
T Y ™ E. MEDLEY 
DtSTRICT COURT JUDGE" 
DIAMOND FORK LAND 
CO. V. NINOW PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this il day of May, 
2004 
Robert Henry Copier 
Attorney for Diamond Fork Land 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David C, Condie 
Attorney for KaLynn Ninow 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tab I 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased. 
KaLynn Ninow, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
v. 
William Lowe; Augusta Rose; Robert Mortensen; and Grand Staircase 
Land Co., a Utah corporation, 




KaLynn Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and Does I-V, 
Third-party Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030169-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 2, 2004) 
| 2004 UT App 2 9T] 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
Attorneys: Robert H. Copier, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom and Sandra K. Weeks, Lehi, for Appellee i 
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose (collectively, Respondents) appeal 
the trial court's October 1, 2002 order determining that Lowe was in 
contempt of court and the trial court's May 1, 2003 order granting 
summary judgment in favor of KaLynn Ninow. We affirm in part, and 
reverse and remand in part. 
As an initial matter, we have determined that Respondents1 
appeal is taken from a final, appealable order. See In re Estate of 
Voorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961). 
Respondents argue that the trial court erred in its October 1, 
2002 order by determining that Lowe was in contempt of court. 
Pursuant to rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, once a 
temporary restraining order (TRO) is granted, it 
shall expire by its terms within such time after entry, not 
to exceed ten days, as the court fixes, unless within the 
time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended 
for a like period or unless the party against whom the order 
is directed consents that it may be extended for a longer 
period. The reasons for the extension shall be entered of 
record. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). 
The terms of the TRO in this case provided for the preliminary 
injunction hearing to be held at 10:00 a.m. on May 30, 2002, and for 
the TRO to expire at 11:00 a.m. on the same day. The parties did not 
stipulate to an extension of the TRO; Ninow did not request that the 
trial court extend the TRO for "good cause"; and, contrary to 
Ninow1s argument, commencement of the preliminary injunction hearing 
one hour prior to the expiration of the TRO did not operate as a 
"good cause" extension of the TRO. Id. As such, under the plain 
language of rule 65A(b)(2), the TRO expired at 11:00 a.m. on May 30, 
2002. Therefore, Lowe's actions during the noon recess of the 
preliminary injunction hearing were not in violation of the TRO.—-
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination that 
Lowe was in contempt of court for violating the TRO. With respect to 
the relief granted by the trial court in its October 1, 2002 order, 
we reverse only Ninow's attorney fee award.-^- We remand and 
instruct the trial court to order the return to Lowe of all amounts 
paid for Ninow's attorney fees awarded in connection with the trial 
court's contempt determination.-^-L 
Respondents also argue that the trial court erred in its May 1, 
2003 summary judgment order by determining that Gary G. Pahl (Gary) 
owned all 6000 shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. (the 
Corporation) at the time of his death. More specifically, 
Respondents assert that the trial court erred by determining that, 
at the time of his death, Gary owned 3000 shares of the Corporation 
(the 3000 shares) that were previously owned by Frank H. Pahl 
(Frank),-U- Based upon this alleged error, Respondents argue that it 
was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of 
Ninow. 
Pursuant to rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56 also 
provides that 
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in [rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
The 3000 shares were the subject matter of two transfer 
agreements contained in the record before us.-^- In the first 
agreement, dated May 6, 1998 (the May agreement),-^- Frank agreed to 
(7) 
transfer the 3000 shares to Gary.—- In the second agreement, dated 
December 28, 1998 (the December agreement),-^- the Corporation 
agreed to purchase the 3000 shares from Gary, so that the 
Corporation could hold them as treasury stock. In the statement of 
undisputed facts contained in Ninow!s memorandum in support of her 
motion for summary judgment, she asserted that (1) the May agreement 
was completed and "paid in full," and (2) the Corporation did not 
make the required payments to Gary under the December agreement. 
Ninow supported these facts with citations to affidavits and 
exhibits contained in the trial record. Respondents did not 
specifically dispute these facts either in their memorandum in 
opposition to Ninow1s motion for summary judgment, or by way of the 
affidavits and exhibits cited therein. Because Respondents failed to 
"set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial," the trial court was required to accept these facts as 
undisputed.-^- Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Because these undisputed facts, together with the plain language of 
both the May agreement and the December agreement, are determinative 
of Gary's ownership of the 3000 shares at the time of his death, 
summary judgment in favor of Ninow was appropriate. See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 56(c), (e). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not 
err by determining that Gary owned all 6000 shares of the 
Corporation at the time of his death, and we affirm the trial 
court's May 1, 2003 order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Ninow.-™ 
Jame s Z. Davi s, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
1. We disagree with Ninowfs assertion that our holding on this issue 
will "invite judicial chaos." If a party wishes to have a TRO 
extended beyond its original terms, that party can simply seek the 
opposing party's consent to an extension, or request an extension 
from the trial court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(b)(2). Ninow could 
have pursued either of these alternatives prior to or at the outset 
of the preliminary injunction hearing, but chose not to. Even if 
Ninow had been unable to secure consent to an extension from 
Respondents, it is unlikely the trial court would have denied a 
request to extend the TRO until completion of the preliminary 
injunction hearing. 
2. Based upon our resolution of Respondents1 next argument, we 
affirm the trial court's determinations that Lowe was not entitled 
to the $7500 he obtained during the noon recess of the preliminary 
injunction hearing and that he was required to return those funds to 
Ninow. 
3. Respondents argue that Lowe is also entitled to his reasonable 
attorney fees in opposing the contempt motion both in the trial 
court and on appeal. However, none of the legal authorities that 
Respondents have cited in support of this argument authorize an 
award of attorney fees to a party opposing a contempt motion. 
Therefore, we conclude that this argument is inadequately briefed 
and we do not address it further. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998). 
4. Respondents do not dispute that, at the time of his death, Gary 
owned the other 3000 shares of the Corporation. 
5. Neither party asserts that these were not legal, binding 
agreements. 
6. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the May agreement 
is "not ambiguous, and can therefore be interpreted as a matter of 
law." 
7. Respondents assert that the May agreement somehow "conveyed" the 
3000 shares to Lowe. However, this assertion is contrary to the 
plain language of the May agreement. The May agreement provided that 
Lowe was merely "holding" the 3000 shares until the May agreement 
was "fulfilled in whole." The May agreement also provided that it 
was "[Frank's] desire to sell [the 3000 shares] to Gary," and that 
upon "successful completion" of the May agreement, the 3000 shares 
would "belong to Gary." Accordingly, under the plain language of the 
May agreement, the trial court correctly determined that "Lowe had 
no power or authority to retain the [3000 shares] in any way once 
the [May agreement] had been completed." 
8. The trial court determined, and we agree, that the December 
agreement is "unambiguous and may be interpreted as a matter of 
law." 
9. Based upon these undisputed facts, the trial court correctly 
determined that (1) "[a]s soon as the payments had been made under 
the [May agreement], the ownership of the [3000 shares] vested in 
Gary"; and (2) because "[p]ayment was not made according to the 
terms of the [December agreement]," it "was never successfully 
completed and the [3000 shares] could not have become treasury 
stock, either prior to, or following [Gary's] death." 
10. In their reply brief, Respondents ask this court to reverse a 
June 12, 2003 order entered in a separate civil case against Ninow. 
We do not address this argument for several obvious reasons. First, 
although the separate civil case against Ninow may have been 
combined with this case, that did not occur until nearly one year 
after Respondents filed their notice of appeal in this case; 
therefore, any proceedings in the separate civil case against Ninow 
are not part of Respondents' appeal in this case. Also, the June 12, 
2003 order was not entered until after Respondents' notice of appeal 
was filed in this case. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (stating that "the 
notice of appeal . . . shall be filed . . . within [thirty] days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from" 
(emphasis added)). Finally, Respondents raised this argument for the 
first time in their reply brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24(c); Hart v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 139 n.9 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
("[B]ecause this argument was raised for the first time in [the] 
reply brief, we decline to address it."). 
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Attorney for Respondent William Lowe 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of RULING AND ORDER 
GARYG.PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
KALYNN NINOW, personal representative 
of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and guardian 
and conservator of the Estate of Ryan B, Pahl, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE, 
and ROBERT H. COPIER, 
Respondents. 
Having taken certain matters under advisement at a hearing on April 6, 
2005, the court now rules thereon and enters this order. As all other matters that 
have been brought by any party under this probate number have now been ruled 
upon or withdrawn, this shall constitute the final order as to all claims and all 
parties to any and all probate proceedings pending under this probate number. 
The court has now read the written response to the order to show cause that 
was filed by William Lowe prior to the April 6, 2005, hearing that the court had not 
yet seen at the lime of the hearing. The court has also read Lowe!s answer and juty 
-?[<£% 
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demand dated April 19, 2005, and Lowe's motion and memorandum dated April 
19, 2005, seeking an evidentiary trial separate from the other named respondents. 
The court has also read the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Ninow 
v. Lowe, 2004 UT App 291, wherein the Utah Court of Appeals stated "we reverse 
the trial court's determination that Lowe was in contempt of court for violating the 
TRO." [See Ninow v, Lowe. 2004 UT App 291; Page 3 of 6; Paragraph L] 
The court is persuaded that Lowe would be entitled to an evidentiary trial 
before another such determination that Lowe is contempt of court could be entered 
against him. The court is further persuaded that even if everything that KaLynn 
Ninow, the petitioner, has presented to the court, or could present to the court, and 
all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, are viewed in the light that is most 
favorable to Ninow, this court is unable to conclude that Lowe has disobeyed any 
"judgment, order or process of the court" [UCA Sec. 78-32-1(5)] or that Lowe 
engaged in any of the other acts or omissions constituting contempt enumerated in 
Section 1 of Chapter32 of Title 78 of the Utah Code [2005]. Therefore, the court 
is persuaded that it is proper to dismiss this proceeding as to Lowe without the need 
to conduct an evidentiary trial Petitioner has also named Augusta Rose as one of 
the respondents in this proceeding. While she has not yet been served with an 
order to show cause and is not yet before the court, the court concludes that her 
involvement in any alleged contempt, if any, did not include some of the acts that 
were alleged against William Lowe, and that this proceeding should be dismissed as 
to Rose for the same reason that it is being dismissed as to Lowe. Petitioner has 
also named Robert Henry Copier, counsel for Lowe in this proceeding and counsel 
for Lowe and Rose in other matters, as a respondent. Copier has not been served 
with an order to show cause and is not yet before the court as a party. Having now 
concluded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Lowe and Rase, the court 
is persuaded that this proceeding should be dismissed as to Copier as well. It is 
further noted by the court that Copier represented other clients in proceedings 
under this probate and in other civil cases who were not parties to any preliminary 
injunction, that Copier was not a parly to any preliminary injunction, and that there 
has been no showing that Lowe and Rose had the right to exercise control over 
Copier's other clients or to direct Copier in his representation of those clients. It is 
also noted that Copier's activities as an attorney of record in litigation are subject to 
privileges and immunities for activities undertaken in the course of litigation. For 
all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the above-entitled proceeding 
styled as KaLynn Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, and Robert H. Copier\ 
is hereby DISMISSED. It appears that all other proceedings that were previously 
pending under this probate number have also been concluded, and that Lowe and 
Rose withdrew all other matters in which they sought affirmative relief, giving as 
their reason the following three factors: [1] the court, as of April 6, 2005, has now 
ruled upon Respondents' Motion to Vacate Order Setting Aside Default Judgment; 
[2] Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and has had a reasonable amount of 
lime to dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property; and [3] the 
Utah corporation Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., has now ceased business 
operations and the land and buildings xinder its control have been sold, stripping the 
corporation of any value. It is noted that Ninow is still the guardian of Ryan Pahl 
even though Ryan Pahl has reached the age of majority and that William Lowe and 
Augusta Rose have claimed herein that they had hoped to prevent Ninow from 
closing down the business operations and selling the land and buildings until Ryan 
Pahl reached the age of majority and had had a reasonable amount of time to 
dismiss Ninow as his guardian and take control of his property. It is noted that 
Ninow has been engaged in litigation over property with extended Pahl family 
members other than Lowe and Rose and that said protracted litigation was only 
recently resolved without any adjudication on the merits from any trial court. Any 
delay experienced by Ninow in selling the land and buildings was not solely a result 
of litigation in which only Lowe, Rose, and/or Copier were involved with her as 
parties or counsel. She has been able to close down the business operations of 
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and sell the land and buildings in which those 
business operations were conducted without any court order on the merits in any of 
the litigation in which she was involved with Lowe, Rose, and their counsel Copier, 
and litigation with Pahl family members independent of Lowe, Rose, and Copier. 
Accordingly, this final order dismissing the proceeding styled as KaLynn 
Ninow vs. William Lowe, Augusta Rose, andRobert H. Copier concludes all 
litigation now pending or that had been pending under Probate No. 003901101. 
DATED THIS Zty DAY OF APRIL, 2005. 
BY: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing [proposed] ruling and order was this-day mailed to: 
Daniel Van Woerkom^andraKVeeks/Hala Afu 
2975 West Executiv^JParkwayj, Suite 414 
Lehi UT 84043 
DATED THIS 21ST DA# OF APREl 2005 
TabK 
NLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 6 2005 
eputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
KALYNN NINOW, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of 
Gary Gunther Pahl and as 
Guardian and Conservator of the 
Estate of Ryan B. Pahl, 
Petitioner, 
vs, 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE, 
ROBERT H. COPIER, DIAMOND FORK 
LAND COMPANY, INC., 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 003901101 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on April 6, 
2005. At the beginning of the hearing, counsel informed the Court 
that argument would primarily deal with the petitioner's Motion for 
Order to Show Cause in Re: Contempt. However, after argument on 
the Order to Show Cause had concluded, counsel for respondent Lowe, 
Mr. Copier, proceeded to raise other pending Motions which required 
resolution. After hearing argument and ruling on these various 
Motions, the Court took the Order to Show Cause under advisement. 
Since doing so, the Court has had an opportunity to review the 
VL 
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voluminous amount of pleadings submitted in this matter. In fact, 
to date, the Court has reviewed 10 volumes of pleadings filed in 
the consolidated probate matter alone. 
In addition, after taking this matter under advisement, the 
Court began receiving a flurry of additional pleadings from the 
parties. For instance, on May 5, 2005, the petitioner filed what 
initially appeared to be a renewed Motion for Order to Show Cause 
in Re Contempt. The Court's law clerk has since clarified with the 
petitioner's counsel that this Motion was indeed substantively 
identical to the Motion already under advisement and that it was 
filed primarily to correct any procedural irregularities that may 
have arisen while serving the prior Motion and to add a new 
respondent, Diamond Fork Land Company, Inc. Therefore, the hearing 
scheduled for this second Motion for Order to Cause was 
subsequently struck. 
That brings the Court to the matter at hand. The issue before 
the Court is whether respondent Lowe (the one respondent who 
acknowledges having been properly served with the original Motion 
for Order to Show Cause and who filed a formal Objection to the 
Order to Show Cause) should be held in contempt for violating the 
Preliminary Injunction (entered on August 26, 2002) and the Order 
of Summary Judgment (entered on May 1, 20 03). 
PAHL ESTATE PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Respondent Lowe argues that he should not be held in contempt 
with respect to the Preliminary Injunction because it expired when 
the Order of Summary Judgment was entered. He contends that since 
the Preliminary Injunction was no longer in effect, he could not 
have violated it. 
After carefully reviewing the record, the Court concludes that 
while styled as an Order of Summary Judgment, Judge Medley actually 
granted only a partial summary judgment as to the portion of claims 
dealing with the ownership of the 6,000 shares of Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc. ("Loan Office"). In fact, as the 
petitioner correctly points out, the Probate Petition is still 
pending because the second portion of the claims, dealing with the 
ownership of certain State Street property, has yet to be 
adjudicated. Therefore, the Court rules that the Preliminary 
Injunction did not expire with the entry of the Order of Summary 
Judgment. Rather, the Preliminary Injunction remains in place and 
defendant Lowe remains subject to it. 
Next, respondent Lowe's arguments with respect to the Order of 
Summary Judgment are far more convoluted and apparently rest on the 
presumption that this Order was somehow limited in scope and that 
it did not preclude him or other individuals and entities from 
continuing to pursue an ownership interest in the Loan Office. 
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Since the Order of Summary Judgment clearly adjudicated the 
ownership of all 6,000 shares in the Loan Office, this argument is 
simply not credible. Therefore, the Court rules that the Order of 
Summary Judgment clearly applied to respondent Lowe. 
Having made the foregoing rulings, the next step is for the 
Court to assess whether respondent Lowe has violated the 
Preliminary Injunction and/or Order of Summary Judgment by the 
various actions detailed in the petitioner's moving papers and 
whether he should be held in contempt. There has been some debate 
over whether the Court can make this assessment based on the 
parties' written submissions or whether it should instead schedule 
an evidentiary hearing. The typical approach for contempt 
proceedings is for the Court to conduct a hearing where counsel is 
given the opportunity to either proffer evidence or present 
testimony concerning the alleged contempt. Therefore, the Court 
schedules a hearing for June 29, 2005, at 9:30 a.m. 
The Court notes that the contempt hearing will serve a dual 
purpose. First, the Court will address whether the additional 
parties specified in the petitioner's second Motion for Order to 
Show Cause should be subject to the rulings of this Memorandum 
Decision and to the outcome of the contempt hearing. After ruling 
on the issue of additional parties, the Court will proceed with the 
issue of contempt, in the manner discussed above. 
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In closing, the Court notes that Mr. Copier has been sending 
a plethora of letters addressed to the undersigned. The Court now 
instructs that neither side is to write directly to the Court. 
While the letters have been problematic, the Court is impressed 
with counsels1 effort to at least confer on certain issues, rather 
than immediately bringing them to the Court's attention. Given 
that this case already has 10 volumes of pleadings, the Court is 
optimistic that counsel will continue in this cooperative spirit. 
Finally, it appears that there have been continued issues of 
serving the respondents and Mr. Copier. If these issues pose a 
significant problem to the petitioner's counsel, they may be raised 
to the Court during the contempt hearing. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
ruling that the Preliminary Injunction and Order of Summary 
Judgment apply to respondent Lowe and deferring a final resolution 
of whether his (and potentially others') actions potentially 
violated these orders and resultecj^i^ a contempt of Court. 
Dated this L~i/xiay of May,/ 
..**"
 ;
 , ^ LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this c*y? day of 
May, 2005: 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
Hala L. Afu 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow 
2975 W. Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Robert Henry Copier 
Attorney for Respondent William Lowe 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Third Judicial District 
AUG 19 2005 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for Respondents 7\* 
William Lowe and Augusta Rose Deputy cieriT 
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose] 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL, DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of FINAL ORDER ON THE 
MAY 29, 2002, PETITION 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Probate No. 003901101 
Deceased. Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
In the matter of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, deceased 




William Lowe, Augusta Rose, Robert Mortensen, 





Ryan Pahl, KaLynn Ninow, Richard Ninow, and Does I-V 
Third-party Respondents 
Kalynn Ninow having admitted by written filing dated July 8, 2005, that she 
will not pursue the merits of her May 29, 2002, petition beyond the May 1, 2003, 
order granting summary judgment, the court, being sufiBciently advised, ORDERS: 
"^-££0 
1. All remaining claims under the May 29, 2002, petition are dismissed. 
2. William Lowe and Augusta Rose are hereby ordered removed as officers 
and directors of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and, as they have no authority 
over Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., by virtue of this removal, the preliminary 
injunction that was entered in connection with the May 29, 2002, petition is lifted. 
3. Augusta Rose's defamation claims against KaLynn Ninow and Ryan Pahl 
remain pending. The judgment and permanent injunction against Richard Ninow 
in favor of Augusta Rose entered by Judge Tyrone E. Medley remain in full effect. 
4. All unadjudicated URCP 11 motions remains pending. 
DATED THIS ity ^9&&m*MJGUST, 2005. 
tT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of this [proposed] order was mailed on August 12, 2005, to 
Daniel Van Woerkom, Sandra Weeks and Hala Afu 
2975 Wesi^xecutive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi UT R4043 \ 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninowf 
ROBERT; Hip*RY COPIEI 
^omeyJer William Lowe and Augusta Rose 
[As Attorney for Augusta Rose] 
TabM 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF GARY G. PAHL 
MINUTES 
PROBATE MINUTES 
Case No: 003901101 EF 
Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS 




Petitioner's Attorney: HALA L AFU JR 
RAY G MARTINEAU 
Other Parties: SANDRA K WEEKS 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER 
Video 
Tape Number: 2:07 pm 
Counsel stipulate that the summary judgment is withdrawn. Counsel 
argues the order to show cause. The Court takes the order to show 
cause issue under advisement and will render a written ruling. Mr 
Copier argues the issue of the undertaking. Ms Weeks gives opposing 
arguments. The Court orders the motion for the undertaking is 
denied. Mr Copier makes a motion m regards to rule 11. A rule 11 
motion has not been filed, and therefore denied. Mr Copier makes a 
motion in regards to the ruling on 6/12/03 be vacated. The Court 
orders the motion to vacate is denied. Ms Weeks makes a motion to 
stay any remaining pending motions until a ruling on the order to 
show cause. Mr Copier stipulates to the motion. 
Page 1 (last) 
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ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for William Lowe, Augusta Rose, 
and Grand Staircase Land Company 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
MAR 2 1 W\ 
SALI LAKfrCOUNrY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE ~ PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
MOTION TO DROP PARTIES 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Grand Staircase Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose, move 
the court, pursuant to URCP 21, to drop them as parties. The proceeding in which 
they were interested involved the common shares of PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, 
Inc., and it is currently before the Utah Court of Appeals, with briefing underway. 
KaLynn Ninow has indicated she still intends to litigate issues in the probate 
court involving the ownership of real property at 1588 and 1594 South State Street. 
These three movants do not claim any ownership interest in that property. 
This motion is supported by a memorandum 
DATED this 24th day of M^rch, 2bp4. 
ROBERT HE>JRY COPIER 
AttomevJfeyWilliam Lowe, Augusta Rose, 
rd^Staiicase Land Company 
d 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
True copies of the foregoing were this-day mailed to: 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, L.C. 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi UT 84043 
David C. Condie 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
DATED this 24th day of March, 2004 
Lowe, Augusta Rose, 
e Land Company 
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727 
Attorney for William Lowe, Augusta Rose, 
and Grand Staircase Land Company 
17 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 272-2222 
By. 
s
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^TSST 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION 
In the matter of the estate of 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DROP PARTIES 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Grand Staircase Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose, have 
moved the court, pursuant to URCP 21, to drop them as parties. The proceeding 
in which these movants were interested involved the common shares of Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office, Inc., and it is currently before the Utah Court of Appeals, with 
briefing underway. KaLynn Ninow has indicated she still intends to litigate issues 
in the probate court involving the ownership of real property at 1588 and 1594 
South State Street. These three movants do not claim any ownership interest in 
that property. They are also not interested in pursuing other or further relief in the 
probate court until after the appeal is decided and should be dropped as parties 
to any proceeding which KaLynn l)Jinowistill intends to pursue in the probate court. 
since their participation any such/proceeding is not needed for a just adjudication. 
DATED this 24th day of March, 
^RCffiERr 
XHflpliey^ fiJr William Lowe, Augusta Rose, 
and vrajm Staircase Land Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
True copies of the foregoing were this-day mailed to: 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, L.C. 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi UT 84043 
David C, Condie 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake CityjyTx84111 / 
DATED this 24th day of March, 20J34. 
tOBERT 
ATtorireyiSr WiluWLowe, Augusta Rose, 
and Gra«d Staircase Land Company 
TabO 
By. 
F,T^0, ,STIMcr c o i m 
Third Judicial District 
M M 2000 
SALTLAK^C0UNTY 
"•pwiy c»# fr 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom (USB #8500) 
Sandra K. Weeks (USB #8491) 
Hala L. Afu (USB #8967) 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
2975 West Executive Parkway, Suite 414 
Lehi, Utah 84043 
Telephone: (801) 407-8330 
Facsimile: (801)407-8331 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gary Gunther Pahl and 
as Guardian and Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL, 
Deceased. 
KALYNN NINOW, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Gary 
Gunther Pahl and as Guardian and 
Conservator of the Estate of Ryan B. Pahl, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA ROSE, 
ROBERT H. COPIER, 
Respondents, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR A STAY 
Probate No. 003901101 
Judge Lewis 
Kalynn Ninow, by and through her above named counsel, hereby responds to the 
Respondents' motion (dated June 24, 2005) for a stay of contempt proceedings as follows. 
1. The Motion to Stay should be denied as the contempt proceeding is the only remaining 
matter in which Respondents' have an interest in this case. Once the issue of contempt is 
decided, this probate case will be able to move speedily toward conclusion. 
2. The Motion to Stay should be denied as Respondents have already requested and were 
granted one continuance of the contempt hearing from June 29, 2005, to July 21, 2005. 
The July 21, 2005 date was selected by Respondents' counsel. Any further delays will 
substantially prejudice Petitioner in her efforts to conclude this matter. 
3. There is no need to have the preliminary injunction lifted as the record in this case clearly 
shows that Respondents have been removed as officers and directors of the Loan Office 
and that they have no authority to act on behalf of the Loan Office. 
4. The preliminary injunction entered in this case should be converted to a permanent 
injunction as prayed in the contempt pleadings filed and on record in this matter. Any 
stay of the contempt proceedings will prejudice Petitioner in her attempts to protect the 
estate from Respondents' repeated and continual attempts to improperly exercise control 
over the assets of the estate. 
Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that Respondents' motion for a stay be denied 
in full and that the contempt proceeding on July 21, 2005 be heard as scheduled. 
2 
^ 
DATED thisX^ day of July, 2005. 
VAN WOERKOM & WEEKS, LC 
Daniel F. Van Woerkom 
Sandra K. Weeks 
Hala L. Afu 
Attorneys for KaLynn Ninow 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jj day of July, 2005,1 placed in the mail, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing addressed as follows: 
Robert Copier 
17 East 400 South 
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oAL^CW pfARTMtN'l 
Daniel. F. Van Woerkom USB #8500 
David Condie USB #8053 
VAN WOERKOM & CONDEE, LC 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6195 
Facsimile: (801) 363^4850 
JS THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
GARY G. PAHL PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF 
OWNERSHIP FQRSJMRES OF STOCK 
Deceased. AND INTERESTS^ REAL ESTATE 
Civil No. 003901101 
Judge Medley 
Kalynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Gary G. Pahl, 
and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator for Ryan B. Pahl, the only heir 
(devisee) of Gary G. Pahl, in order to protect and preserve the property of the Estate hereby petitions 
this Court for a hearing to detennine and establish the ownership of shares of stock in Pahl's Salt 
Palace Loan Office as well as the ownership interests in the real property and improvements 
associated with the Loan Office which are located at 1588 and 1594 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
The circumstances giving rise to the need for this determination and the grounds, for the 
relief requested are more particularly outlined below. 
PahTs Salt PalacJe Loan OfiSce Inc. ("Loan Office") is a Utah corporation which was formed 
in 1969. In lay terms, the Loan OfiSce is engaged in the pawn business. There are six thousand 
shares of common stock authorized and issued by the Loan OfiSce. Prior to his death, Gary G. Pahl 
("Gary") had acquired all six thousand shares. Gary acquired 3000 shares whichhad belonged to his 
father, Appoloneur Gunther Pahl, ("Gunther") following Gunther's death in 1996. In 1998, an 
agreement was entered into whereby Gary would purchase the remaining 3000 shares from his 
uncle, Frank EL Pahl ("Frank"). 
Gary personally owned a one-third interest in the buildings located at 158$ & 1594 South 
State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. One building houses the Loan Office, the other is rented to 
another business entity. The Loan Office also held a one-third interest in the buildings described 
above. Therefore, in his personal capacity and via his 100% ownership of the stock in the Loan 
Office, Gary owned an undivided two-thirds interest in the buildings. 
Gary died intestate on June 25,2000. He had one son, Ryan B. Pahl ("Ryan"), who was 17 
years old at the time of his father's death. On September 6, 3000, the Third Judicial Court 
appointed KaLynn Ninow ('T£aLynn"), Gary's ex-wife and Ryan's mother, as Personal 
Representative of Gary's estate and decreed that Gary died intestate. KaLynn had previously been 
appointed as Guardian and Conservator for her son Ryan on August 30,2000, 
The present petition to determine the ownership of shares and of the interests in real estate 
are directed at protecting Ryan's interests in the Loan OfiBce'and the real estate mentioned abova As 
the only heir/devisee of the estate of his late father, all of Gary's property, including the six thousand 
shares of stock in the Loan Office, and the ownership interest in the buildings belongs to Ryan as the 
beneficial owner. However, by virtue of her appointment as Guardian and Conservator for Ryan, 
KaLynn holds legal title to the property on Ryan's behalf. 
Ryan began to work with his father in the Loan Office at a very young age. Ryan watched 
closely and observed the workings of the business. Gary told his son that someday the business 
would belong to him and that he needed to pay attention and learn how to run it Ryan applied 
himself and proved very adept despite his youth However, there are those who are now attempting 
to take control and alienate Ryan from the business for which he has worked and which he owns. 
The seeds of the attempted coup began to appear in public documents in 1999, when Gary 
filed an annual report with the Department of Commerce, State of Utah, amending the list of officers 
and directors of the corporation Gary named William T. Lowe fXowe") and Augusta Rose 
("Rose") as directors of the Loan Office. Gary and Lowe were also the only two officers of the 
corporation, with Lowe serving as vice president and treasurer, and Gary occupying the positions of 
president and secretary. 
On September 16, 2000, ten days following the appointment of KaLynn as personal 
representative for Gary PahTs estate, Lowe filed a Registration Information Change Form with the 
Department of Commerce, State of Utah, designating Robert K Mortensen ("Mortensen") as 
President of the Loan Office, Rose as Vice-President and Secretary, and Lowe as Treasurer. Lowe 
took this action without notice.to.KaLynn, and never called a shareholders' meeting to elect 
directors to fill the vacancy left by Gary's death 
In January, 2001, the corp&ration was renewed by sending in an automatic renewal coupon 
with appropriate payment No new changes in corporate structure were filed No shareholder's 
meeting was ever called or held. 
Ryan continued to work in the Loan Office following his father's death. It appeared both to 
him and to KaLynn that Lowe, Mortensen and Rose recognized Ryan as the "owner" of the business. 
As lat&aS^iieceinber, 2001, Lowe prepared documents to America Online which acknowledged 
Ryan as the "owner" of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office. From the time of Gary's death until very 
recently, neither Ryan nor KaLynn suspected that Lowe, Rose or Mortensen would ever take any 
action to undermine Ryan's rights with respect to the Loan Office. 
However, recent events have made it clear that Lowe has abused the position of trust and 
confidence placed in him by the late Gary Pahl and the Loan Office. As will be more fully 
described in the following paragraphs, Lowe has wrongfully attempted to entrench himself and take 
over the business. 
A little more than a month ago, after Lowe had repeatedly refused to turn over information 
and documents requested by KaLynn, Ryan informed Lowe during a conference call with his 
attorney and Lowe, that he no longer wished to have Lowe serve as treasurer or to work for the Loan 
Office in any capacity. In response, Lowe, Rose and Mortensen purported to "release" or fire him 
and told him he was no longer allowed to be involved with the Loan Office. Lowe has also recently 
provided a list of shareholders which alleges that Rose and Mortensen are each the owners of 1500 
shares of stock. In addition to refusing to provide a copy of the corporation's stock transfer ledgers, 
Lowe has fllso refused to provide financial and other corporate information which has been 
requested repeatedly, and has wrongfully asserted control of the Loan Office and the management of 
the real estate located at the addresses indicated above. Lowe has failed again in 2002 to hold the 
annual shareholder's meeting and has allowed the corporation to become delinquent by failing to 
file.annual renewal fees. 
Documents were made. available on May 24, 2002, to counsel for the Personal 
Representative in this case which demonstrate that through a series of alleged directors' meetings 
which reportedly took place in late August and early September, 2000, William Lowe, Augusta Rose 
and Robert Mortensen attempted to take ownership of the shares of stock which Gary had acquired 
from his uncle Frank Pahl. There is substantial credible evidence that Lowe and others have 
engaged in acts of wrongdoing, including conversion and misappropriation of corporate funds, and 
destruction of corporate records. 
The Affidavits of Ryan B. Pahl, KaLynn Ninow, Frank H. Pahl, Harold D. ("Dan") Pahl, 
Rachel Peirce and Jay W. Taylor were submitted in connection with a memorandum in support of a 
motion for ex parte restraining order and order to show cause for the issuance of a preliminary 
injunction The memorandum in support of that motion as well as the supporting affidavits are also 
incorporated herein by reference in support of this Petition 
It is the position of the personal representative, KaLynnNinow, that these affidavits, along 
with the other documentation provided, clearly establish that there is ho possible way that any of the 
shares of stock in the Loan Office have ever been transferred to Rose or Mortensea However, these 
individuals have now asserted that the shares were transferred and belong to them. 
With respect to the property located at 1588 and 1594 South State Street in Salt Lake City, 
said property is owned by the members of DDTS LLC, whether in their individual capacity or via the 
LLC, KaLynn Ninow (in her representative capacity as Guardian and Conservator for her son Ryan), 
and PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., each owning an undivided one third interest as tenants in 
common Actions taken by Lowe pertaining to these buildings are also discussed which reveal that 
he has abused his position as the de facto or self-appointed operating agent and trustee of said 
property. While the ownership of the interest in this real property does not appear to be disputed as 
between the individuals and entities named above, the control over rents received and the disposition 
of funds associated with the real estate has become a source of contention in that William T. Lowe 
has taken it upon himself to maintain control of the funds. The owners of the interests in the real 
property do not wish to have William T. Lowe involved in the control or management of their real 
property and require the assistance of the court in disentangling Mr. Lowe from their affairs. 
WHEREFORE, Ms. Ninow respectfully requests that the Court set a time for hearing to 
determine the ownership interests of the individuals asserting ownership ixi the stock of the 
corporation as well as the real property and improvements thereon, entering suchprovisional orders 
regarding time for discovery pertaining to the issues raised in this Petition, and for such further 
orders as are just and reasonable under the circumstances, as well as such further relief to which the 
Estate may be entitledainder the circumstances, such as costs, attorneys fees, etc. 
DATED, this the 2yd&Y of May, 2002. 
VAN WOERKOM & CONDDB, LC 
David C. 
